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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY’S SELECTION EFFECTS 
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ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court has described the “driving force” behind 
qualified immunity to be its power to dismiss “insubstantial” cases before 
discovery and trial. Yet in a prior study of 1,183 Section 1983 cases filed 
against law enforcement in five federal court districts around the country, I 
found that just seven (0.6%) were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage 
and just thirty-one (2.6%) were dismissed at summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds. These findings undermine assumptions about the role 
qualified immunity plays in filed cases, but leave open the possibility that 
qualified immunity serves its intended role by screening out insubstantial 
cases before they are ever filed. Indeed, some have raised this possibility as 
reason to maintain the status quo. 
This Article tests this alternative “screening” justification for qualified 
immunity. Drawing on my prior study of 1,183 Section 1983 cases, as well 
as qualitative data from ninety-four surveys and thirty-five interviews of 
attorneys who entered appearances on behalf of plaintiffs in those cases, I 
find that qualified immunity almost certainly increases the cost, risk, and 
complexity of constitutional litigation, but has a more equivocal effect on 
attorneys’ case-selection decisions. Attorneys do not reliably decline cases 
vulnerable to attack or dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. And when 
lawyers do decline cases because of qualified immunity, they do not appear 
to be screening out “insubstantial” cases under any plausible definition of 
the term. These empirical findings enrich our understanding of the role 
qualified immunity plays in civil rights cases, contribute to mounting 
evidence that qualified immunity doctrine fails to achieve its intended policy 
goals, and support growing calls to better align the doctrine with the realities 
of constitutional litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Available evidence suggests that only 1% of people who believe they 
have been wronged by the police ultimately sue.1 This Article asks what role 
 
 1 MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS 
BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY 16–20 (2005) (finding 
that the police had used force against 664,458 people, 87.3% of whom believed that the police acted 
improperly, and just 7,416 (1.1%) of whom filed a lawsuit regarding the alleged misconduct). Note that 
this survey concerns only police uses of force. Each year, millions of people believe they are wrongfully 
stopped by the police while driving or walking. See ELIZABETH DAVIS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 4, 11, 14 
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qualified immunity plays in decisions to forgo litigation by the remaining 
99%.2 
The answer to this question is critically important for an informed 
understanding of the extent to which qualified immunity doctrine serves its 
intended policy goals. The Supreme Court has described the “‘driving force’ 
behind [the] creation of the qualified immunity doctrine” to be resolving 
“‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials . . . prior to discovery”3 
and at summary judgment.4 But in a recent study of constitutional litigation 
against law enforcement officers and agencies in five federal districts across 
the country, I found that just seven (0.6%) of the 1,183 cases in my dataset 
were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage and just thirty-one (2.6%) were 
dismissed at summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.5 These 
findings undermine assumptions that qualified immunity causes most 
Section 1983 cases to be dismissed before discovery and trial,6 but leave 
 
(2018). We do not know how often people sue who believe they have been mistreated by the police in 
ways that do not involve the use of force. 
2 Qualified immunity shields law enforcement officers and other executive officials from damages 
liability—even if they have violated the U.S. Constitution—so long as they have not violated “clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A law 
enforcement officer or executive official sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating a plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights can raise qualified immunity—usually in a motion to dismiss or at summary 
judgment—and the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts that defendants should prevail unless the 
plaintiff can point to “controlling authority in their jurisdiction” or a “consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority” holding factually similar conduct to be unconstitutional. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 
(1999). For an overview of qualified immunity, the ways in which it has shifted over the past fifty years, 
and criticisms of the doctrine, see generally Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Case Against]. For an overview of 
§ 1983 litigation, see generally Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, Third Edition, FED. JUD. 
CTR. (2014), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Section-1983-Litigation-3D-FJC-Schwartz-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC5K-VYG9]. 
 3 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 
n.2 (1987)). 
 4 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 5 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2 (2017) 
(reporting the results of a study of § 1983 filings against law enforcement officers and agencies in five 
federal districts over a two-year period and finding, contrary to conventional wisdom, that qualified 
immunity was rarely the formal reason cases were dismissed). 
 6 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 852 
(2010) (“The Supreme Court’s effort to have more immunity determinations resolved on summary 
judgment or a motion to dismiss—in other words, to create immunity from trial as well as from liability—
has been largely successful.”); Stephen R. Reinhardt, Essay, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise 
of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of 
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1245 
(2015) (reporting that the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence has “created such powerful 
shields for law enforcement that people whose rights are violated, even in egregious ways, often lack any 
means of enforcing those rights”); Martin A. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 143 (reporting that “courts decide 
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open the possibility that qualified immunity nonetheless serves its intended 
function by screening out insubstantial cases before they are ever filed. 
Understanding the impact of qualified immunity on case selection is 
also key to better appreciating the role qualified immunity doctrine plays in 
civil rights litigation. Based on my previous finding that few cases are 
dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, one might assume that the 
doctrine plays an insignificant role in the litigation of constitutional claims. 
Yet drawing this conclusion would vastly overstate the implications of that 
research. Although my study showed that qualified immunity rarely is the 
formal reason that Section 1983 cases against law enforcement end before 
discovery and trial, it did not answer other important questions concerning 
the role qualified immunity plays in the decision to file a lawsuit, and the 
ways in which the doctrine influences pleading, litigation, and settlement 
decisions.7 A complete understanding of the role qualified immunity plays in 
constitutional litigation requires taking account of these additional litigation 
effects. 
Although understanding the impact of qualified immunity on case 
selection would enrich descriptive accounts of the doctrine and help answer 
whether qualified immunity serves its policy aims, measuring qualified 
immunity’s selection effects is no easy feat. It is conventional wisdom that 
most grievances never become filed lawsuits.8 It is also conventional wisdom 
that it is exceedingly difficult to measure which grievances are never pursued 
in court, or to measure the impact of particular doctrines or other 
considerations on the case-selection process.9 Some studies have used filed 
 
a high percentage of § 1983 personal-capacity claims for damages in favor of the defendant on the basis 
of qualified immunity”). 
 7 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 48–51 (reporting findings regarding filed cases but observing that 
open questions remain regarding the role qualified immunity plays in case filing and litigation decisions). 
 8 See generally William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: 
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980) (describing many factors that 
influence whether incidents become grievances, claims, or legal disputes); Richard E. Miller & Austin 
Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 52 
(1980) (measuring the rate of grievances, claims, disputes, and court filings for tort, discrimination, and 
divorce claims). For filing rates in police misconduct cases, see supra note 1, which reports available 
evidence of filing rates in cases concerning police uses of force. 
 9 See, e.g., Ellen Berrey & Laura Beth Nielsen, Rights of Inclusion: Integrating Identity at the Bottom 
of the Dispute Pyramid, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 233, 242 (2007) (“Despite the legal, social, and political 
importance of what happens at the bottom of the dispute pyramid, it is difficult to empirically study what 
happens there.”); David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1224 (2013) (describing the ways in which studies of the impact of Twombly and 
Iqbal, two Supreme Court cases defining pleading standards, have struggled to account for selection 
effects); Felstiner et al., supra note 8, at 634–36 (describing the “conceptual and methodological 
difficulties” in measuring the transformation of disputes); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of 
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cases and other objective data in combination with presumed models of 
attorney behavior to estimate selection effects.10 Others have drawn 
conclusions from interviews with plaintiffs’ attorneys about their filing 
decisions.11 
In this Article, I combine these two approaches.12 First, I examined an 
original docket dataset of 1,183 police misconduct cases filed in five federal 
districts to better understand the role played by qualified immunity in the 
litigation of these cases. I then surveyed ninety-four attorneys who entered 
appearances on behalf of plaintiffs in these 1,183 cases and conducted semi-
structured interviews with thirty-five of these attorneys as a way of getting a 
“ground-level, gestalt sense”13 of the role qualified immunity plays in 
constitutional litigation and in case-selection decisions. All empirical studies 
have methodological limitations, and this study is no exception.14 But it 
offers the richest and most comprehensive evidence available with which to 
explore these important questions. 
Based on my docket dataset, surveys, and interviews, I find that 
qualified immunity almost certainly increases the costs and risks of Section 
1983 litigation. Although qualified immunity is rarely the reason that cases 
end, there remains a risk that cases will be dismissed on qualified immunity 
grounds—most likely after the parties have completed costly discovery. 
Litigating the defense is also costly—qualified immunity was raised in 
approximately one-third of the cases in my dataset and was sometimes raised 
by defendants multiple times. Each time defendants raise qualified 
immunity, plaintiffs’ counsel must take the time to research and brief their 
motions in opposition.15 Qualified immunity motions and interlocutory 
appeals of qualified immunity denials also result in delays—of months or 
years—while the motions are pending.16 These delays can increase the cost 
of preparing for trial, and can weaken a plaintiff’s case if witnesses’ 
 
Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and 
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 12 (1983) (describing disputes as “difficult to chart. They are not 
some elemental particles of social life that can be counted and measured. Disputes are not discrete events 
like births and deaths; they are more like such constructs as illnesses and friendships, composed in part 
of the perceptions and understandings of those who participate in and observe them”). 
 10 See studies cited infra note 47. 
 11 See studies cited infra note 48. 
 12 For a detailed description of my methodology, see infra Part II. 
 13 See Engstrom, supra note 9, at 1238. 
 14 For discussion of the methodological limitations of this study, see infra notes 58–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 15 See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
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recollections of the underlying facts get hazier over time.17 Apart from the 
challenges of defeating qualified immunity motions in any given case, 
qualified immunity makes civil rights practice more challenging in general. 
Attorneys must learn about and keep abreast of changes in what is considered 
to be an extremely complex doctrine, and the specter of interlocutory appeal 
means that attorneys must be skilled in both trial and appellate advocacy.18 
Prevailing models of attorney case selection suggest that these costs and 
risks would discourage plaintiffs’ attorneys from filing any cases vulnerable 
to attack on qualified immunity grounds.19 If so, and if such cases are in fact 
“insubstantial,” the “driving force” behind qualified immunity would be 
achieved by the doctrine before plaintiffs ever open the courthouse door. Yet 
my dockets, surveys, and interviews offer two compelling reasons to 
conclude that qualified immunity poorly serves this screening function. 
First, qualified immunity has a more equivocal effect on case-selection 
decisions than attorney case-selection models would suggest. More than 
two-thirds of the attorneys I interviewed reported that qualified immunity in 
and of itself rarely or never causes them to decline civil rights cases.20 These 
attorneys agree that qualified immunity poses many challenges, but believe 
that those challenges replicate other case-selection considerations, are too 
unpredictable to influence filing decisions, can be mitigated by including 
claims that cannot be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, or pose risks 
worth taking in order to advance important interests. For reasons I will 
explain, I believe that my data likely overrepresents attorneys who hold this 
view.21 But their perspectives indicate that the costs and risks of qualified 
immunity do not reliably cause attorneys to decline cases. 
Second, when attorneys do decline cases because of qualified 
immunity, they do not appear to be screening out “insubstantial” cases under 
any plausible definition of the term.22 Attorneys I interviewed reported 
declining cases because the cost of litigating qualified immunity outweighed 
the likely financial rewards, and because the factual allegations had not 
 
 17 See infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 81–85, 94 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra Part I. 
 20 Of the thirty-five attorneys I interviewed, eleven reported that they consider qualified immunity at 
case selection, but that it rarely or never influences their selection decisions, and thirteen reported that 
they do not consider qualified immunity at case selection. For further description of these perspectives, 
see infra Section IV.B; Appendix Table 7. 
 21 See infra notes 213–215 and accompanying text. 
 22 For further discussion of these findings, see infra Section IV.C. 
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previously been ruled unconstitutional.23 One attorney reported that he 
stopped bringing any Section 1983 cases because immunities pose an 
insurmountable barrier, and there is circumstantial evidence to suggest the 
challenges of civil rights litigation—including qualified immunity—may 
cause many more attorneys to reduce the number of civil rights cases they 
accept, or get out of the business of civil rights litigation altogether.24 
Attorneys’ answers suggest that qualified immunity is decreasing the total 
number of cases filed, but that it is not screening out cases for lack of merit. 
These findings could not come at a more important time. In recent 
years, the United States Supreme Court has issued a spate of decisions 
reversing lower court denials of qualified immunity—often in cases 
involving fatal force by law enforcement—and proclaiming the importance 
of qualified immunity to “society as a whole.”25 At the same time, circuit and 
district judges around the country,26 advocacy groups across the political 
 
 23 For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity doctrine, which requires 
plaintiffs’ counsel to identify a prior case holding similar conduct to be unconstitutional, see Schwartz, 
The Case Against, supra note 2, at 1814–16. 
 24 For further discussion of these findings, see infra Section IV.D. 
 25 City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015) (“Because of the 
importance of qualified immunity ‘to society as a whole,’ the Court often corrects lower courts when they 
wrongly subject individual officers to liability.”) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 
(1982)). For other instances in which the Court described qualified immunity as important to “society as 
a whole,” see, for example, Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam); White v. Pauly, 137 S. 
Ct. 548, 551 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam). 
 26 For recent circuit and district court decisions critical of qualified immunity, see, for example, 
Horvath v. City of Leander, No. 18-51011, 2020 WL 104345, at *5–13 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2020) (Ho., J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that he would “welcome a principled 
reevaluation of our precedents” related to qualified immunity); Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499–
500 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring dubitante) (observing that he and “a growing, cross-ideological 
chorus of jurists and scholars” are calling for reconsideration of qualified immunity), opinion withdrawn 
on reh’g, 928 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019); Ventura v. Rutledge, 398 F. Supp. 3d 682, 698 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 
2019) (“[T]his judge joins with those who have endorsed a complete reexamination of the doctrine which, 
as it is currently applied, mandates illogical, unjust, and puzzling results in many cases.”); Manzanares v. 
Roosevelt Cty. Adult Det. Ctr., 331 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1293–94 n.10 (D.N.M. 2018) (“The Court disagrees 
with the Supreme Court’s approach. The most conservative, principled decision is to minimize the 
expansion of the judicially created clearly established prong, so that it does not eclipse the congressionally 
enacted § 1983 remedy.”); Estate of Smart v. City of Wichita, No. 14-2111-JPO, 2018 WL 3744063, at 
*18 n.174 (D. Kan. Aug. 7, 2018) (“[T]he court is troubled by the continued march toward fully insulating 
police officers from trial—and thereby denying any relief to victims of excessive force—in contradiction 
to the plain language of the Fourth Amendment.”); Thompson v. Clark, No. 14-CV-7349, 2018 WL 
3128975, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018) (“The legal precedent and policy justifications of qualified 
immunity, it has been charged, fail to validate its expansive scope. The law, it is suggested, must return 
to a state where some effective remedy is available for serious infringement of constitutional rights.”); 
Wheatt v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:17-CV-377, 2017 WL 6031816, at *1 n.7 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 
2017) (criticizing the Supreme Court for allowing interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials). 
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spectrum,27 and several sitting Supreme Court Justices28 have called on the 
Court to modify qualified immunity or do away with the defense. These 
critics argue that qualified immunity bears no resemblance to common law 
defenses in effect when Section 1983 became law, undermines government 
accountability, and is both unnecessary and ill-suited to shield government 
officials who have acted reasonably from financial liability and other 
burdens of litigation.29 
One key empirical question left unanswered thus far in this debate is 
posed by this Article: Whether qualified immunity fulfills its policy goals by 
screening out insubstantial cases before they are filed. Indeed, some have 
raised this possibility as a reason to maintain the status quo.30 My study has 
 
 27 Advocacy organizations also criticize qualified immunity. See, e.g., Brief of Cross-Ideological 
Groups Dedicated to Ensuring Official Accountability, Restoring the Public’s Trust in Law Enforcement, 
and Promoting the Rule of Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 6, Almighty Supreme Born 
Allah v. Milling, No. 17-8654, 2018 WL 3388317 (July 11, 2018) [hereinafter, Brief of Cross-Ideological 
Groups for Official Accountability, Almighty Supreme Born Allah] (describing a “cross-ideological 
consensus that this Court’s qualified immunity doctrine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 misunderstands that 
statute and its common law backdrop, denies justice to victims of egregious constitutional violations, and 
fails to provide accountability for official wrongdoing”). This collection of organizations has filed briefs 
raising similar arguments in other cases. See Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups Dedicated to Ensuring 
Official Accountability, Restoring the Public’s Trust in Law Enforcement, and Promoting the Rule of 
Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Baxter v. Bracey, 751 F. App’x 869 (6th Cir. 2018), appeal 
docketed, No. 18-1287 (Apr. 10, 2019) [hereinafter, Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups for Official 
Accountability, Baxter]; Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups Dedicated to Ensuring Official 
Accountability, Restoring the Public’s Trust in Law Enforcement, and Promoting the Rule of Law as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 2616 (2019) (mem.); see also, e.g., Alan Feuer, Advocates from Left and Right Ask Supreme 
Court to Revisit Immunity Defense, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/nyregion/qualified-immunity-supreme-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/9F7Z-T8EZ] (describing a petition for certiorari in a qualified immunity case joined by 
advocates across the political spectrum); Nicolas Sonnenburg, Unlikely Bedfellows in the Fight Against 
Qualified Immunity, L.A. DAILY J. (Sept. 21, 2018) (describing criticisms of qualified immunity by 
Justices Thomas and Sotomayor, as well as the Cato Institute, ACLU, and other groups). 
 28 See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (expressing 
concern that the Court’s decision “sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers . . . . that they 
can shoot first and think later”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(recommending that, “[i]n an appropriate case, we should reconsider our qualified immunity 
jurisprudence”); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
Court’s qualified immunity doctrine for “sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing”). 
 29 See sources cited supra notes 26–28; see also sources cited infra note 222 (describing these 
arguments against qualified immunity). 
 30 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 
975 (2019) (expressing concerns about “frivolous and distracting litigation” in a world without qualified 
immunity); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1881 (2018) (“[Q]ualified immunity’s core effectiveness might well not 
be in district courts formally utilizing the defense to dispose of Section 1983 lawsuits. Instead, its main 
influence could be in discouraging plaintiffs to file Section 1983 lawsuits at all . . . .”). 
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the best available evidence with which to answer this question and offers 
compelling reasons to conclude that qualified immunity cannot be defended 
on these grounds. My study also reveals that qualified immunity undermines 
government accountability in underappreciated ways: by discouraging 
lawyers from filing cases involving novel claims, making it more difficult 
for lawyers to make a living bringing civil rights cases, and causing lawyers 
to abandon this line of work.31 As the Supreme Court considers growing calls 
to modify or do away with qualified immunity, it should heed this additional 
evidence of the doctrine’s failures. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes 
prevailing models of attorneys’ case-selection decisions. In Part II, I describe 
the methodology of my study. Part III draws on the docket dataset, surveys, 
and interviews to describe the costs and risks of qualified immunity in 
constitutional litigation. In Part IV, I rely primarily on attorney surveys and 
interviews to describe the impact of qualified immunity on case-selection 
decisions. And, in Part V, I consider the implications of these findings for 
descriptions of qualified immunity’s role in constitutional litigation, the 
extent to which qualified immunity doctrine achieves its intended policy 
goals, and proposals to reconsider or do away with the defense. 
I. A THEORY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY’S ROLE IN FILING DECISIONS 
The Supreme Court has described qualified immunity as a shield from 
the burdens of discovery and trial in insubstantial cases.32 Although the 
Court’s decisions have always suggested that qualified immunity would 
achieve this goal through the dismissal of filed cases, qualified immunity 
could also conceivably achieve this goal by screening out insubstantial cases 
before they are filed.33 
How might qualified immunity serve this prefiling screening function? 
Scholars generally expect that a plaintiff will file a case if the likelihood of 
prevailing and their expected monetary gain is greater than or equal to their 
anticipated costs.34 In this model, the expected recovery equals the amount 
 
 31 See infra notes 237–247 and accompanying text (describing these findings). 
 32 See, e.g., supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 33 See supra note 30. 
 34 For a foundational account of this model, see Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A 
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 
(1982), which imagines rational economic calculations regarding filing, settlement, and trial depending 
on the system for allocating litigation costs. See also, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: 
PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 22 (2010) (describing models of litigant 
behavior drawn from law and economics literature that assume “both parties are guided in their decisions 
at each stage [of litigation] by the expected monetary gain or loss should the case be tried” but also 
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awarded if the plaintiff prevails (J), discounted by the probability that they 
will prevail (p). The costs (C) are the plaintiff’s expected litigation costs. So, 
a plaintiff will file suit if: 
p J  ≥  C 
This model needs some tweaking to reflect attorneys’ typical fee 
arrangements in the types of cases in which qualified immunity is raised.35 
Attorneys generally accept civil rights cases on contingency, with a 
provision entitling them to seek their reasonable attorneys’ fees from the 
defendant if the plaintiff prevails.36 As William Hubbard has observed, 
attorneys considering whether to accept a case on contingency should assess 
the probability of success (p), the size of a judgment (J), and the percentage 
of the judgment they will recover under the terms of their fee agreement (f), 
against the cost of litigation (C).37 So, presumably, a plaintiff’s attorney will 
agree to file a suit on contingency if: 
p f J  ≥  C 
 
recognizing that “the choice of whether or not to sue may be influenced by forms of utility or disutility 
distinct from and not reducible to money”); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining 
Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as 
Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719, 742 (1988) (expecting that plaintiffs in constitutional tort cases 
“will file suit if the expected recovery from the suit outweighs the expected costs”). 
 35 I focused on plaintiffs’ attorneys in my interviews and surveys—instead of uncounseled people 
with grievances against the police—because I assume that qualified immunity plays a limited role in pro 
se plaintiffs’ decisions to file suits. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 36 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 NW. U. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 182, 184 (2007) (explaining that most civil rights litigation is brought “by individual 
lawyers who are trying to make a living”); Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 756–57 (1993) (asserting that 
“most suits are taken on a contingency basis”); Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3–5 (2008) (describing typical fee arrangements in § 1983 cases); Schwab & 
Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 768 (“[M]ost civil rights litigation is not brought by institutional litigators or 
by large firms engaging in pro bono activity.”). More than 72% of the ninety-four attorneys I surveyed 
for this study reported that they always or usually (70%–99% of the time) enter into contingency fee 
arrangements with plaintiffs in § 1983 cases. Another 4% always take cases on contingency, 
supplemented with a limited retainer. Twelve percent take cases pro bono, with the ability to seek fees 
pursuant to Section 1988. Another almost 10% rely on some combination of contingency, contingency 
with retainer, and pro bono arrangements. Just two of the ninety-four lawyers who responded to my 
survey always require their clients to pay them by the hour. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Misconduct 
Attorney Survey Results (on file with journal). 
 37 See William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 707 
(2016). For an in-depth exploration of contingency fee attorneys’ calculations of risk and reward in case 
selection, see HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 67–88 (2004). 
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As Hubbard recognized, this calculation is dynamic and complex. Costs 
will increase over the course of litigation.38 The probability of prevailing and 
the size of an expected judgment may also shift, depending on which judge 
is assigned to the case, the information unearthed during discovery, and the 
results of motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. Moreover, 
if the plaintiff prevails after trial, or the attorney is otherwise authorized to 
seek fees pursuant to Section 1988, the attorney may be able to recover their 
reasonable fees from the defendant instead of taking a percentage of the 
plaintiff’s award.39 An attorney who accepts a Section 1983 case on 
contingency must conclude that the expected recovery at some stage of the 
litigation—taking account of all of these contingencies—will outweigh their 
expected costs at that stage. 
Although the civil rights bar that brings damages actions appears to be 
dominated by private attorneys,40 there are also pro bono and nonprofit 
lawyers bringing civil rights cases who do not rely on a contingency fee. To 
the extent that pro bono and nonprofit lawyers bring civil rights damages 
actions, they are not expected to have the same financially driven 
calculations of risk and reward.41 But pro bono and nonprofit attorneys are 
not immune to the financial implications of bringing these cases. Even if pro 
bono attorneys and nonprofits do not bring cases on contingency, they can 
still recover fees if the plaintiff prevails, and that money would likely be 
welcomed by an attorney or organization with limited funds. Moreover, 
because pro bono attorneys and nonprofits have limited time and resources, 
they will want to select cases most likely to achieve their intended goals and 
may be disinclined to take a case that will be particularly expensive or time-
consuming to litigate.42 In other words, whether or not attorneys rely on fees 
from civil rights cases to pay their bills, cases likely become less attractive 
as the cost of litigation increases and the likelihood of success decreases. 
If the prevailing model accurately reflects attorneys’ case-selection 
process, qualified immunity could discourage attorneys from accepting cases 
 
 38 Hubbard, supra note 37. 
 39 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012) (allowing reasonable attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties in 
§ 1983 cases); see also Mark R. Brown, A Primer on the Law of Attorney’s Fees Under § 1988, 37 URB. 
LAW. 663 (2005) (describing various ways attorneys can seek fees under § 1988). 
 40 See supra note 36. 
 41 See Hubbard, supra note 37, at 713; see also infra note 188 (contrasting the financial incentives 
of nonprofit and private attorneys). 
 42 See Hubbard, supra note 37, at 713 (“To the extent that attorneys working on a pro bono basis and 
legal aid providers are oversubscribed—and they usually are—one should again expect these attorneys 
to screen cases on plausible merit before filing. Whether an attorney’s motivation is maximizing profit or 
maximizing relief to deserving plaintiffs (or both), the incentive will be to select those cases with higher 
merit.”); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(describing the incentives of pro bono and nonprofit attorneys when selecting cases). 
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by shifting their calculation of risk and reward. Qualified immunity might 
do so in several different ways. It could increase the risk that a case would 
be dismissed, thereby decreasing the probability of success (p). Qualified 
immunity could also increase the risk that the plaintiff’s case will be 
dismissed in part, thereby reducing the size of any possible judgment (J). Or 
qualified immunity could increase the costs of litigation (C). If qualified 
immunity decreases the probability of success, decreases the likely size of a 
judgment, and/or increases the costs of litigation, then under prevailing 
models of attorney case-selection decisions, attorneys will be less willing to 
accept cases in which qualified immunity is likely to be raised—and 
especially unwilling to accept cases where the defense is likely to be 
successful. 
The Supreme Court’s stated hope is not that qualified immunity will 
shield government officials from the burdens of discovery and trial in all 
cases, but that it will protect government officials from these burdens in 
“insubstantial” cases.43 The Court has not defined what constitutes an 
insubstantial case, however. In some decisions, the Court has suggested that 
insubstantial claims are “baseless” and “frivolous,” brought against 
“innocent” government officials.44 In other decisions, the Court has written 
that qualified immunity should protect “all but the plainly incompetent or 
 
 43 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 44 See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590 (1998) (explaining that Harlow’s 
“reformulation of the qualified immunity defense” to eliminate consideration of officers’ subjective intent 
was justified by two considerations: “First, there is a strong public interest in protecting public officials 
from the costs associated with the defense of damages actions. That interest is best served by a defense 
that permits insubstantial lawsuits to be quickly terminated. Second, allegations of subjective motivation 
might have been used to shield baseless lawsuits from summary judgment”) (emphasis added); Mitchell 
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 553–54 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I have 
no doubt that trial judges employing [Harlow’s] standard will have little difficulty in achieving Harlow’s 
goal of early dismissal of frivolous or insubstantial lawsuits.”) (emphasis added); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982) (“The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance 
between the evils inevitable in any available alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for 
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees . . . . At the same 
time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as 
the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole.”) (emphasis added); 
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507–08 (1978) (noting that qualified immunity is a workable standard 
for executive officers because “[i]nsubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert 
to the possibilities of artful pleading . . . . Moreover, the Court recognized in Scheuer that damages suits 
concerning constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly 
supported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity. In responding to such a 
motion, plaintiffs may not play dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits”) (emphasis added and 
citation omitted). 
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those who knowingly violate the law”45—suggesting that qualified 
immunity’s protections should have a broader reach. Putting aside for the 
moment whether the Court intends qualified immunity to shield only the 
innocent, or also the incompetent and reckless,46 if qualified immunity 
functions as the Supreme Court intends, it should increase the predicted cost 
of litigation, and/or reduce the predicted size of judgment in insubstantial 
cases—such that it discourages attorneys from filing these types of cases—
without simultaneously discouraging the filing of “substantial” cases. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Several studies have attempted to measure the effects of various 
doctrines on case-filing decisions. Some have used filed cases and other 
objective data in combination with presumed models of attorney behavior.47 
Others have drawn conclusions from interviews with plaintiffs’ attorneys 
about their filing decisions.48 In this Article, I combine these two approaches. 
 
 45 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The Roberts Court has repeatedly cited with approval 
the notion that qualified immunity should protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.” See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018); District of Columbia v. Wesby, 
138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 
548, 551 (2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 
(2015); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 
135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 
535, 546 (2012); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). 
 46 For further discussion of what constitutes an “insubstantial” claim, see infra notes 230–235 and 
accompanying text. 
 47 See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly 
and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012) (measuring the effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal on filing and settlement decisions); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 745–47 (examining the 
effects of § 1988 fee shifting on the decision to file cases). 
 48 See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUD. CTR., IN THEIR WORDS: 
ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 1–2, 25–27 (2010) 
(interviewing thirty-six attorneys about their litigation practice); Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights 
Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197 (1997) 
(interviewing thirty-five plaintiffs’ attorneys to understand how Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 impacted filing and litigation decisions); Daniel Nazer, 
Conflict and Solidarity: The Legacy of Evans v. Jeff D., 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 499 (2004) (reporting 
results of interviews with public interest attorneys about the effects of Evans on filing and litigation 
decisions). Alexander Reinert used this approach to examine the impact of qualified immunity on 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decisions to file Bivens cases. See Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity 
Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477 (2011). “Bivens cases” refer to cases asserting a cause of action—
similar to a § 1983 claim—against federal government actors. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a discussion of the ways in which this study reaches 
findings similar to and distinct from Reinert’s, see infra notes 155, 161, 214, 245 and accompanying text. 
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First, I examined my dataset of all Section 1983 actions filed against 
law enforcement defendants49 in 2011–2012 in five federal districts—the 
Southern District of Texas, the Middle District of Florida, the Northern 
District of Ohio, the Northern District of California, and the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. I chose these five districts because a high volume of Section 
1983 cases are brought there, they have a range of different sized law 
enforcement agencies and agencies of comparable sizes, and I expected 
judges in these districts would vary in their approach to qualified immunity.50 
I hand-coded each case, taking note of when motions to dismiss and motions 
for summary judgment on qualified immunity and other grounds were made 
by defendants, granted by courts, and dispositive. I also tracked the timing 
and disposition of interlocutory and final appeals of qualified immunity 
decisions. And I compared these results in cases where plaintiffs represented 
themselves—referred to here as pro se cases—and cases where plaintiffs 
were represented by legal counsel. 
Next, I surveyed and interviewed plaintiffs’ attorneys who entered 
appearances in the 1,183 cases in my docket dataset to gather insights about 
the role qualified immunity plays in their case-selection decisions.51 I 
focused on plaintiffs’ attorneys in my interviews and surveys—instead of 
uncounseled plaintiffs with grievances against the police—because I 
assumed that qualified immunity plays a limited role in pro se plaintiffs’ 
decisions to file suits. Many people who believe they have been wronged by 
 
 49 I focused on lawsuits against law enforcement defendants both because the Supreme Court’s 
qualified immunity decisions have often involved cases brought against law enforcement, and because 
limiting my study to cases against one type of defendant creates some substantive consistency across 
cases and allows for more direct comparison of filing and litigation decisions across districts. For further 
discussion of my rationale for focusing on lawsuits against law enforcement defendants, see infra note 
61 and accompanying text; see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 22. 
 50 The expectation about judicial variation is based in part on a commonly-held view that courts in 
these circuits vary in their approach to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742 (“We have 
repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high 
level of generality.” (citation omitted)); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified 
Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 39–42 (2015) (describing variation between the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits regarding whether courts rule on the merits of constitutional claims in their qualified immunity 
decisions and the frequency with which they recognize new rights in those decisions); Charles R. Wilson, 
“Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447–48 (2000) (describing circuit variation in courts’ interpretations of “clearly 
established law,” with the First, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits defining the standard in a manner 
friendlier to plaintiffs than the Eleventh Circuit). For further discussion of my rationale for choosing these 
five federal districts, see Schwartz, supra note 5, at 19–20. 
 51 I received Institutional Review Board approval from UCLA (IRB#16-000470) for this survey and 
the subsequent interviews. 
114:1101 (2020) Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects 
1115 
government officials never sue for a whole host of reasons.52 People who file 
lawsuits without legal assistance may be aware that Section 1983 cases are 
difficult to bring, but I assume for the purposes of this discussion that they 
will be unaware of the precise doctrinal challenges associated with these 
claims and unfamiliar with the contours of qualified immunity—except to 
the extent that an attorney who has declined to take their case has described 
these challenges to them.53 
A total of 1,022 plaintiffs’ attorneys entered appearances in these 1,183 
cases—138 attorneys in the Southern District of Texas, 184 in the Middle 
District of Florida, 174 in the Northern District of Ohio, 266 in the Northern 
District of California, and 260 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. I sent 
an online survey to each of the 1,022 attorneys whose email address(es) I 
could find from court records.54 The anonymous survey has twenty multiple 
choice and open-ended questions regarding the frequency with which the 
respondents file police misconduct suits, the percentage of their practice 
dedicated to these types of cases, the effects of various doctrines on their 
practice, and what they consider to be the most significant barriers to relief 
in police misconduct cases. Of the 976 survey requests I sent out, seventy-
one emails failed to deliver, and ninety-four attorneys filled out surveys.55 
 
 52 Available evidence suggests that just 1% of people who believe they have been wronged by the 
police actually sue. See DUROSE, supra note 1. For some theories about why people do not sue law 
enforcement see, for example, Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law 
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 
284 (1988), which explains that people might not sue for a number of different reasons, including 
“ignorance of their rights, poverty, fear of police reprisals, or the burdens of incarceration.” For possible 
reasons that various types of grievances may never become filed lawsuits see, for example, Galanter, 
supra note 9, at 13–18, which describes several studies measuring behaviors and decisions at the bottom 
of the dispute pyramid. 
 53 See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Essay, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, 
100 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 206 (2014) (studying the effects of Twombly and Iqbal pleading requirements 
on case filing decisions and finding that pro se plaintiffs are “comparatively immune to selection effect, 
because those plaintiffs more slowly adjust by ceasing to pursue some of the cases that could not surmount 
the new barrier”). 
 54 Although I sent the online survey to a total of 976 email addresses, I do not know for certain how 
many attorneys I reached with those emails. Some lawyers reported no email address in court records; 
some attorneys included multiple email addresses; and, in some cases, multiple attorneys in a firm 
appeared to share the same email address. 
 55 Attorneys filled out the survey responses between April 17, 2017 and May 11, 2017. Of the 905 
survey requests that presumably reached their intended targets, I had a response rate of at least 10.4%. 
For some context regarding this response rate, see Scott Keeter et al., What Low Response Rates Mean 
for Telephone Surveys, PEW RES. CTR. (May 15, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/RDD-Non-response-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2YN-RYJJ], where 
Keeler notes that Pew Research telephone surveys have a response rate of 9% and citing research 
suggesting “response rate is an unreliable indicator of bias.” See also Geon Lee et al., Survey Research 
in Public Administration: Assessing Mainstream Journals with a Total Survey Error Framework, 72 PUB. 
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The final question in my online survey asked attorneys to send me their 
email address if they wished to be contacted for a follow-up interview. Fifty-
seven attorneys did so. I emailed each of these attorneys, and twenty-five 
responded and agreed to be interviewed. I then reached out to twenty-five 
additional attorneys across the five districts, requesting interviews. I chose 
these attorneys because they had filed three or more cases in their district 
during the study period and/or because I knew the attorneys’ reputations for 
bringing such cases. Ten of those attorneys agreed to be interviewed.56 In 
total, I interviewed thirty-five attorneys—seven attorneys from each of the 
five districts in my docket dataset. 
During these interviews, I asked attorneys about their case-selection 
decisions, the role qualified immunity doctrine plays in their filing decisions, 
the litigation of claims against law enforcement more generally, and their 
views about the challenges and rewards of civil rights litigation. I used a 
semi-structured format and explored additional topics as they arose. As a 
result, some interviews covered topics that were not addressed in other 
interviews, and interviews varied in the depth with which they explored 
certain topics. These interviews lasted between eighteen and eighty-five 
minutes. All but one was recorded and transcribed.57 I promised these 
attorneys confidentiality, although several made clear that they were happy 
for me to use their names. 
This mixed-methods approach presents a more complete and nuanced 
portrait of qualified immunity’s role in litigation and case-selection decisions 
than would any single method alone. The docket dataset offers valuable 
information about the ways in which qualified immunity is raised and 
decided across the five districts in my study. The surveys and interviews 
provide insight into how attorneys perceive qualified immunity’s costs and 
risks—key to understanding what role the doctrine plays in attorneys’ case-
selection decisions. Yet all empirical studies have methodological 
limitations, and this study is no exception.  
First, the study focuses on practices in five federal districts. I chose 
these five districts in part because I believed the judges in these districts and 
 
ADMIN. REV. 87, 91 (2011) (reporting that articles are published with survey response rates ranging from 
10%–90%+ in public administration). 
 56 These ten attorneys did not take the online survey, but I did add to their interview protocol the 
questions that were posed in the online survey. 
 57 This interview was not recorded because of a technological error; I and the interviewee both 
expected the interview would be recorded and transcribed. Once I realized the interview was not being 
recorded, I transcribed what I could of the interview in real time. Additionally, the transcription service 
used for all thirty-five interviews produced transcripts with several grammatical errors. For ease of 
reading, I have corrected those errors and have not indicated deviations from transcripts in-line. 
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in the corresponding circuits would vary in their approach to qualified 
immunity and other aspects of Section 1983 litigation.58 But, each year, in 
ninety-four federal districts and in state courts around the country, thousands 
of lawyers file thousands of Section 1983 cases against law enforcement 
defendants.59 I cannot be certain that the ways in which Section 1983 cases 
are litigated in the five districts in my study are consistent with litigation 
practices in these federal and state courts, or that the lawyers litigating in 
these five districts share the views of lawyers litigating these cases around 
the country.60 
Second, this study focuses on Section 1983 cases against state and local 
law enforcement. I focused on lawsuits against law enforcement defendants 
both because the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence—particularly in 
recent years—has largely developed in these types of cases, and because it 
creates some substantive consistency across the cases in the dataset.61 I do 
not know for certain whether these findings about the costs and risks of 
qualified immunity or the role qualified immunity plays in case-selection 
decisions are equally applicable to other types of civil rights claims. But the 
attorneys I surveyed and interviewed who brought other types of civil rights 
claims did not indicate that their litigation or case-selection processes are 
different when they bring Section 1983 claims against other types of 
government defendants. 
Third, I cannot be certain that the attorneys I surveyed and interviewed 
accurately described their views about qualified immunity or the role the 
doctrine plays in their case-selection decisions. One could, for example, 
imagine that attorneys might exaggerate the damaging effects of qualified 
immunity to build a case against the doctrine, or underplay the disruptive 
effect of qualified immunity as a way of demonstrating their skillfulness as 
litigators. But attorneys were assured confidentiality in their surveys and 
interviews to minimize self-serving statements and encourage them to speak 
frankly about their views. A different concern about attorneys’ accuracy is 
that they might inadvertently misperceive the effects of qualified immunity 
on their case-selection decisions and other aspects of their work. But the 
 
 58 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 59 Available data indicates that 37,802 “civil rights” cases were filed in federal court in 2017, which 
includes voting, employment, housing and education cases, among others. See U.S. District Courts-Civil 
Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending 
March 31, 2016 and 2017, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/ 
fjcs_c2_0331.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9NJ-KNJ4]. Section 1983 cases against law enforcement 
would likely be included in a subcategory of “civil rights” cases called “other civil rights” cases. There 
were 14,941 “other civil rights” cases filed in federal court in 2017. See id. 
 60 For further discussion of this methodological limitation, see Schwartz, supra note 5, at 23–24. 
 61 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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attorneys’ verifiable observations—about the frequency with which 
qualified immunity resulted in case dismissals, for example—were 
consistent with data from the docket dataset, which should inspire 
confidence in the accuracy of their other observations. 
Finally, I do not know whether the thirty-five attorneys I surveyed and 
interviewed hold views representative of the 1,022 attorneys who entered 
appearances in the 1,183 cases in my docket dataset. Attorneys willing to 
take the time to fill out surveys and be interviewed might, for example, be 
especially frustrated about the costs and challenges of Section 1983 
litigation, or they might be motivated to bring Section 1983 litigation for 
different reasons than the lawyers who did not respond to my requests. The 
attorneys I surveyed and interviewed are clearly unrepresentative in one 
way—they filed more police misconduct cases, on average, than other 
attorneys who entered appearances in the cases in my dataset.62 Attorneys 
who file fewer police misconduct cases may have different views about the 
costs and risks associated with qualified immunity—or the impact of those 
costs and risks on filing decisions—than those who file more. 
Despite the overrepresentation in my study of attorneys with a more 
active civil rights docket, the attorneys in my study vary in many ways 
regarding their civil rights litigation practices.63 Some have brought hundreds 
of police misconduct cases, and others have brought only a few.64 Some 
spend virtually all of their time litigating police misconduct suits, and others 
devote only a small percentage of their time to these cases.65 Some primarily 
represent plaintiffs bringing the highest damages cases—those involving 
wrongful convictions and deadly force. Others usually represent plaintiffs in 
cases concerning what one attorney referred to as the “smaller indignities” 
of police stops and frisks.66 The attorneys I interviewed and surveyed include 
 
 62 See Appendix Tables 1–3, which reflect the total number of appearances by all of the 1,022 
attorneys who entered appearances during the two-year study period in my docket dataset (Appendix 
Table 1); the appearances of attorneys I interviewed during the two-year period in my docket dataset 
(Appendix Table 2); and the appearances surveyed attorneys reported over a five-year period in police 
misconduct cases (Appendix Table 3). 
 63 See Appendix Table 7 for information about the attorneys I interviewed, including the percentage 
of time they spend on civil rights cases, the other types of work they take on, their fee arrangements with 
clients, and their practice setting. 
 64 See Appendix Table 7. 
 65 See Appendix Table 7. 
 66 N.D. Cal. Attorney E; see also N.D. Cal. Attorney D (reporting that he does not bring shooting 
cases but, instead, brings cases concerning “all the little incremental violations—the false arrest stuff, the 
kick in your door and trashing the house stuff; you know, the traffic stop unreported toss your car stuff. 
You know, rough you up a little bit stuff; you know, lie about what you said; stuff that needs addressing 
and that people don’t make any money on.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney G (explaining that he does not take 
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partners at midsized and small firms, solo practitioners, and employees of 
nonprofits.67 And the attorneys have, combined, several centuries-worth of 
experience bringing thousands of police misconduct cases on behalf of 
plaintiffs. Accordingly, these attorneys’ varied perspectives and experiences 
can offer valuable insights into the role qualified immunity doctrine plays in 
litigation and case selection. 
III. THE COSTS AND RISKS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Standard models of case selection assume that an attorney will only 
agree to represent a plaintiff if she believes that the likelihood of prevailing 
and her expected monetary gain equals or is greater than her anticipated 
costs.68 Accordingly, assuming these models are accurate, to appreciate the 
effects of qualified immunity on case selection, one must first understand 
how attorneys believe qualified immunity doctrine affects the cost of 
litigation (C), the probability of success (p), and the size of judgments (J). 
In this Part, drawing on my surveys and interviews of attorneys who 
entered appearances in the police misconduct cases in my docket dataset, I 
report attorneys’ perceptions that qualified immunity increases cost and 
delay, decreases the size of judgments, and raises the risk of dismissal. The 
docket dataset reveals litigation patterns and practices consistent with 
attorneys’ perceptions. Then, in Part IV, I describe attorneys’ observations 
about the ways in which these costs and risks influence their case-selection 
decisions. 
A. How Qualified Immunity Affects the Cost of Litigation 
The dockets, surveys, and interviews all suggest that qualified 
immunity doctrine increases the cost, time, and complexity of litigating 
police misconduct cases. Defendants raised qualified immunity in 368 
(31.1%) of the 1,183 cases in my docket dataset.69 In sixty of these 368 cases, 
 
“death cases” that other firms in the area take. “I’m a sole practitioner and I want to just kind of lay in the 
weeds and jump out of the bushes at the right time.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney C (describing himself as a 
“bottom feeder” who has “fought a lot of battles on principle for very small amounts”). 
 67 There are relatively few nonprofit attorneys represented in my surveys and interviews: Just one of 
the attorneys I interviewed and four attorneys I surveyed are employed by nonprofits. But this may well 
reflect the limited role nonprofits play in the civil rights plaintiffs’ bar that brings damages actions. See 
supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 68 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 69 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 29. Qualified immunity could not be raised in 204 of the cases in my 
dataset either because the cases were brought against municipalities or sought solely injunctive or 
declaratory relief (ninety-nine cases), or because the cases were brought against individuals, seeking 
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defendants brought qualified immunity motions two or more times over the 
course of litigation.70 For plaintiffs to respond effectively to a qualified 
immunity motion, they must find factually similar cases—either from their 
circuit or from multiple other circuits—holding defendants’ conduct 
unconstitutional, and then must brief and argue their oppositions to the 
motions.71 
Defendants are also entitled to immediately appeal qualified immunity 
denials that turn on questions of law,72 and in my docket dataset, defendants 
brought interlocutory appeals of forty-one (21.7%) of the 189 qualified 
immunity motions that were denied in whole or in part.73 Plaintiff’s counsel 
will likely have done much of the relevant qualified immunity research in 
the district court. But the style of briefing and argument will likely be 
different in the court of appeals.74 Plaintiffs’ attorneys may also move to 
dismiss the interlocutory appeal and/or ask the district court not to stay trial 
proceedings on the ground that the appeal is frivolous—which necessitates 
additional rounds of briefing.75 
 
damages, but were dismissed by the district court before defendants had the opportunity to respond (105 
cases). Id. at 27–28. Defendants declined to raise qualified immunity in the other 611 cases. Id. at 29. 
 70 See id. at 33. 
 71 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (explaining that defendants violate “clearly 
established law” only when “‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable 
official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right’”) (quoting Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (requiring that 
plaintiffs point to “controlling authority in their jurisdiction” or a “consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority” to defeat qualified immunity). There is circuit variation regarding who bears the burden of 
proving entitlement to qualified immunity. See Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity at Trial, 
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2071–72 (2018). Nevertheless, plaintiffs generally bear the burden of 
finding cases where factually similar conduct was ruled unconstitutional—even in circuits that place the 
burden of pleading and proving entitlement to qualified immunity on the defendant. 
 72 See Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1887, 1905–17 (describing the standards for interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials and 
criticizing the practice because it increases cost, delay, and complexity). 
 73 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 40. 
 74 See N.D. Cal. Attorney B (describing her dislike of interlocutory appeals because she prefers trial 
court practice). 
 75 See E.D. Pa. Attorney A (“I’m particularly irked when frivolous qualified immunity claims which 
are shut down by the district court on summary judgement end up being the subject of interlocutory 
appeal. So you’ve got to spend another six to twelve months or longer dealing with that. I’ve been 
disappointed in those cases that the circuits haven’t come down stronger on attorneys that bring frivolous 
interlocutory appeals where the findings by the district court make it clear that there are factual disputes 
that render the grant of summary judgement simply inapt.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney E (describing a motion 
opposing defendants’ motion for a stay while their interlocutory appeal was pending); N.D. Cal. Attorney 
F (explaining that, at the time of the interview, he was writing a motion opposing defendants’ motion for 
a stay while their interlocutory appeal was pending on the ground that the appeal was frivolous). 
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Attorneys I interviewed reported that qualified immunity motions are 
“burdensome”76 and that the doctrine requires plaintiffs to “litigate 
everything to the nth degree.”77 Attorneys also observed that defense counsel 
may use qualified immunity motions and interlocutory appeals strategically 
to “wear . . . out”78 and “beat down the plaintiff’s counsel,”79 and make their 
lives “somewhat miserable.”80 
Apart from the cost of researching and briefing individual qualified 
immunity motions, learning about and staying abreast of changes in qualified 
immunity doctrine is time-consuming. Courts and commentators have long 
observed that qualified immunity is exceedingly complex.81 Attorneys I 
interviewed reported that mastering this complexity requires a significant 
amount of time and commitment.82 As one attorney explained, “qualified 
immunity is not easily understandable. You have to read a lot of cases and 
do a lot of research.”83 Another attorney described qualified immunity as a 
“morass” that attorneys entering into this practice area need to “sort 
through.”84 He continued: “[I]t takes an enormous amount of dedication to 
do these cases properly. I think it takes an enormous amount of experience 
to do them properly. And there’s a huge learning curve.”85 
Qualified immunity motion practice and interlocutory appeals 
additionally increase the time associated with litigating these cases.86 In my 
 
 76 N.D. Cal. Attorney B. 
 77 M.D. Fla. Attorney B; see also N.D. Ohio Attorney G (predicting that his fees would “go down” 
if qualified immunity were eliminated). 
 78 M.D. Fla. Attorney B. 
 79 E.D. Pa. Attorney A. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 925 (2015) (“One has to work hard to find some doctrinal consistency or 
predictability in the case law and the circuits are hopelessly conflicted both within and among 
themselves.” (footnote omitted)); John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. 
L. REV. 851, 852 (2010) (describing qualified immunity as “a mare’s nest of complexity and confusion”). 
 82 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney F (explaining that lawyers who “don’t regularly” bring civil rights 
cases get “caught on qualified immunity”); N.D. Ohio Attorney C (explaining that civil rights cases 
“require a huge amount of work, investment of time by the attorney and you better know your stuff like 
qualified immunity for example”); S.D. Tex. Attorney C (“I went through a three-year learning curve to 
get up to grasp—up to speed on [civil rights doctrines], and it’s a lot of information.”); see also infra 
notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 83 S.D. Tex. Attorney F. 
 84 M.D. Fla. Attorney C. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Accord Reinert, supra note 71, at 2082 (finding that the median time from filing to trial was longer 
in cases in which qualified immunity was raised, which he found “unsurprising, because one would 
assume that cases involving qualified immunity would take longer to resolve, given the opportunity for 
motion practice and interlocutory appeal”). 
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docket dataset, the interlocutory appeals that were decided on the merits 
took, on average, 441 days from filing to resolution.87 In almost 6% of the 
cases in which defendants brought motions to dismiss on qualified immunity 
grounds, defendants sought and received formal stays of discovery while the 
motions were pending.88 Discovery was stayed in these cases for more than 
150 days, on average.89 
Several attorneys observed that qualified immunity increased the time 
it takes to litigate civil rights cases.90 Attorneys were clearly frustrated by 
these delays in and of themselves,91 but additionally reported that these 
delays add to the cost necessary to litigate these cases and can, in some cases, 
weaken the cases on the merits. One attorney described the uncomfortable 
choice of either continuing to prepare for an uncertain trial while the case is 
on interlocutory appeal, or growing unfamiliar with the case in the year or 
more that it is on appeal and relearning its details again later in preparation 
for trial.92 Witnesses’ recollections of critical facts may fade over the months 
 
 87 Of the forty-one interlocutory appeals I tracked in my docket dataset, one was dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction, and sixteen were withdrawn. 
 88 Discovery stays were formally granted in eight cases, which amounts to 5.9% of the cases in which 
qualified immunity was raised at the motion to dismiss stage (136), and 5.2% of all motions to dismiss 
raising qualified immunity (154). See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 30, 33. 
 89 See Butcher v. City of Cuyahoga Falls, No. 5:11-cv-939, 2011 WL 5971043, at *2 (N.D. Ohio 
Nov. 28, 2011) (case stayed eighty-eight days while motion for judgment on the pleadings pending); 
Belniak v. Fla. Highway Patrol, No. 8:12-cv-1334-T-35MAP, 2014 WL 11394864 (M.D. Fla. March 24, 
2014) (case stayed twenty-six days while motion to dismiss pending); Simmons v. Rutherford, No. 3:12-
cv-946-J-25MCR, 2012 WL 4828582, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2012) (case stayed 171 days while motion 
to dismiss pending); Holton v. Blankinship, No. 3:11-cv-00325, at 2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011) (case stayed 
sixty-three days while motion to dismiss pending); Stiles v. Judd, No. 8:12-cv-02375-T-27EAJ, 2013 WL 
4714402, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2013) (case stayed 199 days while motion to dismiss pending); Harvey 
v. Montgomery County, No. 11-cv-1815, 2012 WL 12530, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2012) (case stayed 
174 days while motion to dismiss pending); Hinojosa v. Sandlin, No. 1:12-cv-00012, at 1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 
23, 2012) (case stayed 293 days while motion to dismiss pending); Shabazz v. City of Houston, No. 4:11-
cv-1125, 2012 WL 12877853, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2012) (case stayed 213 days while motion was 
pending). 
 90 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney B (describing a case that took eight years to resolve because of 
qualified immunity appeals); N.D. Cal. Attorney F (explaining that interlocutory appeals “delay 
everything by 18 months”); N.D. Ohio Attorney D (explaining that qualified immunity increases the time 
it takes to litigate a case by “six months to a year” because of the appeals); N.D. Ohio Attorney G 
(explaining that one of his cases “got delayed for a year and a half when it went up [to the] Sixth Circuit 
and back.”); see also infra notes 91–93, 103 and accompanying text. 
 91 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney A (“I’m particularly irked when frivolous qualified immunity claims 
which are shut down by the district court on summary judgment end up being the subject of interlocutory 
appeal. So you’ve got to spend another six to twelve months or longer dealing with that.”); M.D. Fla. 
Attorney G (“You used to be able to get a jury trial and go win money. Now you’ll get an interlocutory 
appeal to the 11th Circuit . . . .”). 
 92 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney E (describing preparing jury instructions, his witness list, and exhibits 
while a denial of qualified immunity was on interlocutory appeal). 
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or years that qualified immunity motions are litigated and appealed.93 And 
interlocutory appeals require attorneys to brief and argue their cases in a 
court of appeals—a setting that may be less familiar and less comfortable 
than a district court for some attorneys.94 
My docket dataset suggests some regional variation in the costs 
associated with litigating qualified immunity. Defendants in the Southern 
District of Texas and Middle District of Florida raised qualified immunity in 
a greater percentage of cases than did defendants in the other three districts.95 
Defendants in the Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of 
Florida more often raised qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage 
than did defendants in the other three districts,96 and more often raised 
qualified immunity at multiple stages of litigation.97 Courts in the Southern 
District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida also granted stays of 
discovery while qualified immunity motions were pending more often than 
did courts in the other districts.98 By each of these metrics, the costs of 
 
 93 See Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups for Official Accountability, Almighty Supreme Born Allah, 
supra note 27, at 19 (“The resources required to see [an interlocutory appeal] through may render the 
effort untenable, with financial outlays compounding as evidence grows stale. These effects will be 
especially pronounced for claims promising only modest monetary recovery.”); Alphonse A. 
Gerhardstein, Making a Buck While Making a Difference, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 251, 264 (2016) 
(“Interlocutory appeals cause witnesses’ memories to fade or disappear . . . .”); see also S.D. Tex. Survey 
5 (“I have never handled a 1983 suit that didn’t have an interlocutory appeal in the middle—while 
witnesses disappear and documents get shredded.”). 
 94 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney B (explaining that interlocutory appeals are frustrating in part because 
“we’re trial lawyers and we don’t want to be appellate lawyers”). 
 95 In the Southern District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida, defendants raised qualified 
immunity in 54.7% and 54.2% of the cases in which the defense could be raised, respectively, compared 
to 47.5% of the cases in the Northern District of Ohio, 33.8% of the cases in the Northern District of 
California, and 23.9% of the cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 
29. 
 96 In the Middle District of Florida and the Southern District of Texas, defendants raised qualified 
immunity in a motion to dismiss in 32.9% and 19.8% of the cases in which the defense could be raised, 
respectively, compared to 12.2% of the cases in the Northern District of Ohio, 7.8% of the cases in the 
Northern District of California, and .08% of the cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See id. at 
29, 30. 
 97 In the Middle District of Florida and the Southern District of Texas, defendants raised qualified 
immunity two or more times in 13.6% and 9.4% of the cases in which the defense could be raised, 
respectively, compared to 6.1% of the cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 6% of the cases in 
the Northern District of California, and 3.6% of the cases in the Northern District of Ohio. See id. at 33. 
 98 Of the twenty-three qualified immunity motions to dismiss in the Southern District of Texas, three 
(13%) cases were stayed while the motions were pending. Of the fifty-nine qualified immunity motions 
to dismiss in the Middle District of Florida, four (6.8%) cases were stayed while the motions were 
pending. Of the seventeen qualified immunity motions to dismiss in the Northern District of Ohio, one 
(5.8%) case was stayed while the motion was pending. There were thirty motions to dismiss on qualified 
immunity grounds brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and fourteen motions to dismiss on 
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litigating qualified immunity are higher in the Southern District of Texas and 
the Middle District of Florida than in the other three districts in my study. 
But plaintiffs in the Northern District of Ohio bear one type of qualified 
immunity-related cost more than those in any other district in my study: 
defendants in the Northern District of Ohio are far more likely to 
immediately appeal denials of qualified immunity.99 
Attorneys’ reports of the costs associated with qualified immunity are 
consistent with the regional variation apparent in the docket dataset. 
Attorneys from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Northern District of 
California, and Northern District of Ohio reported that defendants usually 
raise qualified immunity at summary judgment.100 In contrast, attorneys from 
the Southern District of Texas and Middle District of Florida reported that 
defendants regularly raise qualified immunity in both motions to dismiss and 
at summary judgment.101 Attorneys from Texas and Florida described 
 
qualified immunity grounds brought in the Northern District of California; no cases were stayed while 
any of these motions were pending. 
 99 Defendants in the Northern District of Ohio brought interlocutory appeals in seventeen of thirty-
five (48.6%) partial or full denials of qualified immunity. In contrast, defendants in the Southern District 
of Texas brought interlocutory appeals in five of twenty-six (19.2%) partial or full denials of qualified 
immunity; defendants in the Middle District of Florida brought interlocutory appeals in nine of the forty-
six (19.6%) partial or full denials of qualified immunity, defendants in the Northern District of California 
brought interlocutory appeals in nine of forty-three (20.9%) partial or full denials of qualified immunity; 
and defendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania brought interlocutory appeals in one of forty-one 
(2.4%) partial or full denials of qualified immunity. See id. at 40. 
 100 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney A (explaining that qualified immunity practice depends on the 
jurisdiction, that “San Francisco does not typically file a 12(b) motion on a police excessive force case,” 
and that “defense attorneys will always include a qualified immunity section of their summary judgment 
motions”); N.D. Cal. Attorney E (explaining that “most of the lawyers in the Bay Area” wait until 
summary judgment to raise qualified immunity); N.D. Cal. Attorney F (explaining that defendants usually 
include qualified immunity in their summary judgment motions but that he has not seen qualified 
immunity raised at the motion to dismiss); N.D. Ohio Attorney C (“I don’t think I’ve ever had a police 
misconduct case where defendant’s counsel did not file a motion for summary judgment and which allows 
in large part qualified immunity. So absolutely qualified immunity is a huge issue in these types of 
cases.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney F (explaining that qualified immunity is not raised in excessive force cases 
at the motion to dismiss, but that it sometimes is in “more murky legal case[s]”); N.D. Ohio Attorney G 
(explaining that “district judges really don’t like qualified immunity motions at the pleading stage” but 
that “we still get qualified immunity motions on summary judgment in almost every case”); E.D. Pa. 
Attorney F (explaining that defense counsel “put [qualified immunity in] every summary judgment 
motion” but “almost never at motion to dismiss stage”); E.D. Pa. Attorney G (reporting that defense 
counsel will “save” qualified immunity arguments for summary judgment). 
 101 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney B (explaining that, even a few years ago, qualified immunity 
motions “did not appear in some motions for summary judgment” but “now it’s coming up in more and 
more motions to dismiss”); M.D. Fla. Attorney D (explaining that qualified immunity is raised “every 
time, even if it’s not valid they’ll take a stab at it, they’ll take a run at it”); M.D. Fla. Attorney G 
(explaining that defendants raise qualified immunity in motions to dismiss); S.D. Tex. Attorney B 
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defendants’ efforts to stay proceedings while motions to dismiss raising 
qualified immunity were pending,102 and attorneys from Ohio complained 
about delays associated with interlocutory appeals.103 
B. How Qualified Immunity Affects the Probability of Success 
Qualified immunity can reduce the likelihood of success because a 
successful motion can cause a plaintiff’s case to be dismissed. In my docket 
dataset, I found that this happened relatively rarely.104 Just seven (0.6%) of 
the 1,183 cases in my dataset were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage 
on qualified immunity grounds, and just thirty-one (2.6%) of the 1,183 cases 
in my dataset were dismissed at summary judgment (or on appeal of a 
summary judgment denial) on qualified immunity grounds.105 But the 
likelihood of dismissal on qualified immunity is greater in some districts than 
in others. Cases in the Southern District of Texas had the highest risk of 
dismissal on qualified immunity—9.2% of cases filed there were dismissed 
on qualified immunity grounds. In contrast, 6.7% of cases filed in the Middle 
 
(reporting that defendants raise qualified immunity in motions to dismiss “[e]very single time without 
fail. . . . [in] every kind of police misconduct case every time”). 
 102 See M.D. Fla. Attorney B (explaining that defense attorneys “always try” to get stays while 
qualified immunity motions are pending but “I would say that maybe once or twice in all the cases that I 
can think of they were actually able to get stays”); S.D. Tex. Attorney B (describing that “the first thing 
[defendants] do is file a motion to dismiss and since the court will not allow discovery in a . . . case where 
they assert qualified immunity prior to ruling on a motion to dismiss, you’re just hamstrung because you 
can’t get the discovery before suit”). 
 103 See, e.g., N.D. Ohio Attorney D (explaining that cases would be “completed sooner” without 
qualified immunity “because if qualified immunity is granted, I appeal it. If qualified immunity is denied, 
they appeal it. It adds time and then [adds] lawyer hours, it [adds] briefing hours, it adds argument hours. 
The whole court of appeals component adds another year, year and a half to a case in our circuit”); N.D. 
Ohio Attorney E (“[Qualified immunity] gives the defendants the ability to call timeout in the middle of 
litigation . . . . [D]efendants get a free shot [to get the case dismissed through an interlocutory appeal and] 
they often take it.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney F (describing interlocutory appeals as “a tactic that most of the 
defense lawyers just feel they have to use . . . . They don’t care if they are shut down [on appeal], because 
at least they get the benefit of the delay” and observing that defendants appeal qualified immunity denials 
“whenever they can”); N.D. Ohio Attorney G (describing a case that was delayed for a year and a half 
while on interlocutory appeal). 
 104 See generally Schwartz, supra note 5 (finding that qualified immunity was rarely the formal 
reason cases were dismissed in five federal districts over a two-year period). Although my study did not 
consider the role of qualified immunity at trial, Alexander Reinert has recently studied this question by 
looking at 287 cases in which qualified immunity was raised, jury instructions were proposed, and the 
case went to or through a jury trial. Reinert, supra note 71. Consistent with my findings about the impact 
of qualified immunity when raised in motions to dismiss and at summary judgment, Reinert found that 
“qualified immunity rarely plays a significant role in jury trials.” Id. at 2088. 
 105 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 45. When one eliminates pro se filings from the dataset, just 0.2% of 
the 910 cases were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at the motion to dismiss stage, and 3.4% 
were dismissed at summary judgment (or on appeal of a summary judgment denial) on qualified immunity 
grounds. 
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District of Florida, 2.3% of cases in the Northern District of Ohio, 1.2% of 
cases in the Northern District of California, and 1% of cases in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.106 
Attorneys from the different districts described the likelihood of 
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds in a manner consistent with the 
regional variation seen in the docket dataset. In the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, Northern District of California, and Northern District of Ohio, 
attorneys reported that defendants regularly raise qualified immunity—
particularly in false arrest cases—but that qualified immunity motions are 
infrequently granted.107 Attorneys in these districts reported that they can 
avoid dismissal on qualified immunity grounds if they can create an issue of 
fact, and reported that excessive force cases are rarely if ever dismissed on 
qualified immunity grounds.108 In contrast, attorneys from the Southern 
District of Texas and the Middle District of Florida expressed more concern 
about the prospect of dismissal on qualified immunity grounds in all types 
of cases and at all stages of litigation.109 
 
 106 Id. at 46. If one looks only at represented plaintiffs, the results are approximately the same: Ten 
of 104 (9.6%) counseled cases filed in the Southern District of Texas were dismissed on qualified 
immunity grounds, compared with twelve of 148 (8.1%) counseled cases filed in the Middle District of 
Florida, four of 131 (3.1%) counseled cases filed in the Northern District of Ohio, three of 187 (1.6%) 
counseled cases filed in the Northern District of California, and four of 340 (1.2%) counseled cases filed 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. 
 107 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney A (explaining that if he gathers the evidence necessary to create a 
factual dispute that defeats summary judgment, the “great bulk of the judges here are going to follow the 
law and not grant qualified immunity in most cases”); E.D. Pa. Attorney E (reporting that defendants do 
raise qualified immunity, but “it doesn’t work [in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania] for the most part”); 
N.D. Cal. Attorney A (reporting that “defense attorneys will always include a qualified immunity section 
of their summary judgment motions” but “with more video [recordings] available, we can create triable 
issues of fact, and the qualified immunity defense, so long as we have an expert and they have an expert, 
does not tend to be disposing of as many of these cases”); N.D. Ohio Attorney G (explaining that he 
“can’t think of one” case of his that has been dismissed on the pleadings). 
 108 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney A (“I think the law is now so well developed . . . that it’s really 
tough . . . to lose . . . an excessive force case on qualified immunity grounds.”); E.D. Pa. Attorney D (“I 
have never heard of a motion for qualified immunity in just excessive force [cases] here. Not just my 
cases but any cases.”); E.D. Pa. Attorney F (“[W]ith respect to excessive force cases, I seldom . . . if ever 
see the court grant a summary judgment on those qualified immunity issues . . . .”); E.D. Pa. Attorney G 
(“If we [think force used by an officer is unreasonable], I don’t think qualified immunity deters us in 
those cases.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney G (explaining that, in excessive force cases, “there are a lot more cases 
and even though you may not have a case on all fours, it’s easier to make the argument that the officer 
should have known that what he was doing violated the Constitution when he struck that person while he 
was on the ground in handcuffs or with one handcuff on with his face down, right?”). 
 109 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney F (explaining that he fears getting “bounced” on qualified 
immunity); M.D. Fla. Attorney G (describing one case in which a police officer fired forty-four bullets 
into a car but the Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity because there was not a prior case on point, 
and another case in which the Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity based on the pleadings); S.D. 
Tex. Attorney B (“Motions to dismiss [on qualified immunity] get granted a lot.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney C 
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Even when the chances of dismissal on qualified immunity grounds are 
relatively small, the risk of dismissal may loom large in attorneys’ minds. If 
an attorney takes a case on contingency and that case is dismissed, the 
attorney will lose all the money she invested in the case. As one attorney 
explained: 
[I]f you’re going to go to federal court you’re committing for one attorney . . . 
a fairly substantial amount of time and a substantial amount of funds for the 
client . . . . There’s nothing worse than championing a client’s claim for two or 
three years and having it turn out to be a zero. That’s not [a] good use of the 
attorney time—especially if you’re on contingency fee. It’s not a good use of 
the client’s time—they end up unhappy, they get their hopes up, they turn down 
mediation money and then get nothing. That’s not . . . desirable for anybody.110 
Although cases are infrequently dismissed in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and the Northern District of California on qualified immunity 
grounds, defendants in these districts generally raise qualified immunity at 
summary judgment, after plaintiffs’ counsel have invested in costly 
discovery and motion practice.111 Lawyers in these districts expressed 
concern that they would spend significant time and money in discovery, only 
to have the case dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at summary 
judgment.112 
C. How Qualified Immunity Affects the Size of Judgments 
Qualified immunity may also decrease the size of judgments. In 
seventy-nine of the 1,183 cases (6.7%) in my dataset, district courts granted 
qualified immunity motions in whole or in part, but additional parties or 
claims remained in the case. It is possible that in some of these cases, courts 
may have dismissed the higher damages claims on qualified immunity 
grounds, even as they allowed other federal claims to proceed.113 
 
(explaining that when cases are dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage, “a large percentage are qualified 
immunity”); S.D. Tex. Attorney E (“[N]ine times out of ten they will win the qualified immunity 
argument.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney F (describing a case in which police shot the plaintiff in the face while 
he was in a stationary vehicle but the court dismissed on qualified immunity grounds). 
 110 M.D. Fla. Attorney D. 
 111 See supra notes 97, 100 and accompanying text. 
 112 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney B (explaining that attorneys need to factor in the fact that their case 
may be delayed by motion practice and interlocutory appeals, and that attorneys “have to factor in the 
appeal, and especially now with the courts going the way they are and your chances are reducing by 
having that level of uncertainty intervening”); E.D. Pa. Attorney D (explaining that a concern in case 
selection is “whether I think I’m going to get two years down the road, a year down the road, and then 
they file a qualified immunity [motion] and I’m out”). 
 113 For example, in Porter v. City of Santa Rosa, No. 3:11-cv-04886-EDL (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012), 
the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against defendant police officers, leaving only 
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In other cases, courts dismissed all of plaintiffs’ federal claims on 
qualified immunity grounds but allowed plaintiffs’ parallel state law claims 
to proceed.114 Even though these state law claims concerned the same 
conduct as the federal claims that were dismissed, plaintiffs may have been 
able to recover less for the state law claims than they could have for the 
federal claims. For example, Florida caps damages for state law claims at 
$300,000 per claim.115 Accordingly, when federal claims are dismissed on 
qualified immunity grounds, the total potential recovery—including 
attorneys’ fees—is limited to $300,000. This cap can diminish the potential 
size of recovery or discourage plaintiffs from continuing to pursue their 
claims.116 Plaintiffs whose federal claims are dismissed also lose their 
opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees under Section 1988.117 
 
his Monell claim against the City of Santa Rosa. See Notice of Motion, No. 3:11-cv-04886-EDL (N.D. 
Cal. May 7, 2012); Motion for Summary Judgment (July 2, 2012). Plaintiff’s counsel stopped responding 
to defendant’s communications, and the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Order Dismissing 
Case, No. 3:11-cv-04886-EDL (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012). In Killian v. City of Monterey, No. 5:12-cv-
05418-PSG, 2014 WL 1493941 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014), the plaintiff alleged that he was falsely arrested 
for driving under the influence after he was found asleep in his car. He brought claims for unreasonable 
search and seizure, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and violation of due process and equal 
protection. Id. The court granted defendant qualified immunity for all but the equal protection claim. See 
Order Granting-in-Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Killian, No. 5:12-cv-05418-PSG, 
2013 WL 6577064 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013). Given the claims that were dismissed and the claim that 
remained, the summary judgment order may well have decreased the case’s value. The parties 
subsequently entered settlement negotiations, and the plaintiff approved—but later refused to sign—the 
settlement agreement. See Order to Show Cause, Killian, No. 5:12-cv-05418-PSG (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 
2014). Plaintiff’s counsel then withdrew from the case and the last claim was dismissed. See Order 
Granting Summary Judgment and Motion to Withdraw, Killian, No. 5:12-cv-05418-PSG, 2014 WL 
1493941 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014). 
 114 There were eight cases in my dataset in which federal claims were dismissed on qualified 
immunity grounds and the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice or remanded to state court. 
See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 42 n.103. In at least four additional cases, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed 
their federal claims while qualified immunity motions were pending, so their state law claims were 
remanded to state court. See, e.g., Glass v. City of Saint Petersburg, No. 8:12-cv-02405-RAL-TGW (M.D. 
Fla. filed Oct. 24, 2012); Cooks v. Bailey, No. 3:12-cv-00869-HES-JBT (M.D. Fla. filed Aug. 1, 2012); 
Joseph v. City of Orlando, No. 6:12-cv-00131-JA-DAB (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 27, 2012); Forde v. Home 
Depot, No. 2:11-cv-05823-JS (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 15, 2011). 
 115 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.28 (West 2017). 
 116 In one case in my docket dataset, Spann v. Verdoni, a Sarasota County deputy sheriff shot and 
killed a 20-year-old after he and a friend rang the deputy’s doorbell late at night as a prank. Spann v. 
Verdoni, No. 8:11-cv-00707-TBM (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 4, 2011). The district court granted the deputy 
summary judgment on the federal claims (granting qualified immunity in the alternative) and remanded 
the state claims to state court. See Summary Judgment Order, Spann v. Verdoni, No. 8:11-cv-0707 (M.D. 
Fla. Nov. 27, 2012). The decedent’s family’s attorney informed me that his clients “made the decision 
not to pursue an action in State court” because the damages cap “severely restrict[ed] potential damages.” 
E-mail from W. Cort Frohlich, attorney for plaintiffs in Spann v. Verdoni, to author (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:15 
AM) (on file with journal). 
 117 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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*          *          * 
 
Attorneys across the five jurisdictions in my study report qualified 
immunity increases the cost, complexity, and delay associated with Section 
1983 litigation. There is regional variation in attorneys’ views about the 
likelihood of dismissal on qualified immunity grounds—variation that tracks 
my findings in the docket dataset. But in all five districts, even in districts 
where the actual risk of dismissal on qualified immunity grounds is lowest, 
attorneys fear that cases will be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds at 
summary judgment or interlocutory appeal of a summary judgment denial, 
after they have invested time and money in discovery. Partial dismissals on 
qualified immunity grounds can also reduce cases’ potential value. 
Some attorneys report—and my docket dataset suggests—that concerns 
about the costs and risks of qualified immunity sometimes cause them to 
encourage their clients to settle.118 But do those costs and risks cause 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to screen out cases before filing? And, if so, are the cases 
screened out “insubstantial,” as the Supreme Court has written it intends? In 
Part IV, I consider these questions. 
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CASE SELECTION 
Theories of case selection expect that lawyers accepting cases on 
contingency will be less inclined to accept cases where the anticipated costs 
exceed the likely return.119 As I showed in Part III, attorneys across the five 
federal districts in my study reported that qualified immunity increases the 
costs and risks of civil rights litigation, and can reduce the size of a judgment. 
Accordingly, one would assume that attorneys would be less likely to accept 
cases where defendants are likely to raise qualified immunity in pretrial 
motions, and particularly unlikely to accept cases vulnerable to dismissal on 
qualified immunity grounds. 
The docket dataset can only measure the effects of qualified immunity 
on case selection in an indirect way—by comparing the role of qualified 
immunity in pro se and counseled cases. If one assumes that attorneys—but 
 
 118 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney D (“[E]ven if I win on summary judgment, I might settle the case 
knowing that there’s a possibility that . . . qualified immunity could be a problem at trial.”); E-mail from 
N.D. Ohio Attorney B to author (Jan. 18, 2018, 11:14 AM) (reporting that concerns about qualified 
immunity caused clients to settle a case because they “did not want to either win and have [defendants] 
appeal or us lose and us appeal—this would have stopped the case dead in the water for approximately a 
year and a half”). 
 119 See supra note 34-37 and accompanying text. 
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not pro se plaintiffs—evaluate the costs and risks of qualified immunity 
when deciding whether to file a case, and decline to file cases where those 
costs and risks are high,120 one might expect that pro se plaintiffs would more 
often file cases vulnerable to dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, and 
more of their cases would, in fact, be dismissed on qualified immunity. My 
docket dataset does not support this theory. Pro se plaintiffs were successful 
far less often than represented plaintiffs,121 and cases brought by pro se 
plaintiffs were, on average, dismissed earlier in the course of litigation.122 
But defendants raised qualified immunity in the same percentage of pro se 
and counseled cases (37.6%). And three times more counseled cases than pro 
se cases were dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.123 Courts were more 
likely to grant defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in 
cases brought by pro se plaintiffs—but they were less likely to grant those 
motions on qualified immunity grounds.124 These data suggest that pro se 
plaintiffs are far less likely to succeed, but that neither defendants nor courts 
view pro se cases as more vulnerable to dismissal on qualified immunity 
grounds. This evidence is consistent with my previously stated view that 
qualified immunity is neither necessary nor well-suited to dismiss 
“insubstantial” cases before discovery and trial.125 However, it does not 
foreclose the possibility that attorneys’ concerns about qualified immunity 
cause them to file more “substantial” cases than plaintiffs proceeding pro se. 
Accordingly, to better understand the role qualified immunity plays in 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ case-selection decisions, I asked each of the thirty-five 
attorneys I interviewed to describe the considerations they take into account 
when deciding whether to accept a case. Attorneys’ responses to this 
question, and our subsequent discussions, lead me to four observations about 
 
 120 For the bases for this assumption, see supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 121 Just 16.1% of cases (44 out of 273) brought by pro se plaintiffs ended with a settlement, voluntary 
dismissal, or verdict partially or wholly in plaintiffs’ favor, whereas 71% of cases (637 out of 910) brought 
by represented plaintiffs ended with one of these outcomes. 
 122 A total of 41.4% of pro se cases (113 out of 273) were dismissed sua sponte before the defendant 
answered, as compared to 1.4% of cases (13 out of 910) brought by represented plaintiffs. And 19% (52) 
of pro se plaintiffs’ cases were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage, as compared to 4.5% (41) of 
cases brought by represented plaintiffs. 
 123 A total of 3.6% of counseled cases and 1.5% of pro se cases were dismissed on qualified 
immunity. 
 124 Although I did not track the bases for dismissals in these cases, cases at the motion to dismiss 
stage often fail because plaintiffs have not pled plausible claims or because a criminal conviction bars the 
claims, and at summary judgment courts often find that the plaintiffs have not presented sufficient 
evidence to create a material factual dispute about the existence of a constitutional violation. See 
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 56–57. 
 125 See id. at 53–57. 
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the role qualified immunity plays in these attorneys’ case-selection 
decisions. 
First, the attorneys I interviewed all take a number of different factors 
into account when deciding whether the potential benefits of a case outweigh 
its costs and risks, including: whether the judge and jury will find the plaintiff 
sympathetic and credible; the strength of the evidence supporting the 
plaintiff’s claims; the costs of litigating the case; and the amount of 
recoverable damages. So, to the extent that attorneys are assessing the costs 
and risks of qualified immunity at case selection, they do not consider these 
costs and risks in a vacuum. 
Second, attorneys do not reliably decline cases vulnerable to motion 
practice or dismissal on qualified immunity. Thirteen lawyers I interviewed 
report that they do not take qualified immunity into account when selecting 
cases, and another eleven report rarely declining cases because of qualified 
immunity. These twenty-four attorneys agreed that qualified immunity 
increases the risks, costs, and complexities of Section 1983 litigation, but 
offered several reasons why they do not select cases based on whether 
qualified immunity might be raised or successful. 
Third, attorneys who decline cases vulnerable to motion practice and 
dismissal on qualified immunity reported doing so for reasons unrelated to 
the cases’ merits. Instead, attorneys I interviewed reported declining cases if 
the cost of litigating qualified immunity outweighs the likely financial 
rewards, cases with fact patterns that have not previously been held 
unconstitutional, and cases involving certain types of claims—especially 
false arrest claims—where attorneys believe they must produce evidence of 
intentional misconduct to defeat qualified immunity motions. 
Fourth, qualified immunity appears to cause some lawyers to reduce the 
number of civil rights cases they bring and discourage other attorneys from 
filing any civil rights cases. One attorney I interviewed reported that he has 
stopped accepting Section 1983 cases because immunities pose an 
insurmountable barrier. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the challenges 
of civil rights litigation—including qualified immunity—may cause many 
more lawyers to decrease the number of civil rights cases they file or get out 
of the business of civil rights litigation altogether. 
In this Part, I describe each of these findings in more detail. 
A. Attorneys’ Case-Selection Considerations 
When I asked attorneys what factors they take into account when 
deciding whether to accept a case, five volunteered qualified immunity as a 
consideration, and another seventeen agreed, when asked, that qualified 
immunity plays a role. When I asked why attorneys considered qualified 
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immunity when selecting cases, I received predictable responses about the 
costs and risks associated with the doctrine. But every attorney I interviewed 
described multiple additional factors related to the probability of success, 
anticipated size of judgment, and cost of litigation that inform their case-
selection decisions. 
1. Considerations Related to the Probability of Success 
Many attorneys I surveyed and interviewed believe that judges and 
juries are more sympathetic to police officer defendants and generally hostile 
to plaintiffs’ claims. When I surveyed attorneys about the biggest obstacle to 
bringing police misconduct cases, attorneys’ most common answers were 
judges and juries.126 Attorneys I interviewed agreed, observing that judges 
and juries are often unsympathetic to their clients, and that this perceived 
preference for government defendants can cause judges and juries to dismiss 
plaintiffs’ claims or award plaintiffs minimal damages.127 
 
 126 Eighty-five of the ninety-four attorneys who took the survey answered this question, and offered 
a total of 114 responses. Twenty-seven (31.8%) of these attorneys described juries as one of the biggest 
obstacles to success, and twenty-two (25.9%) described judges as one of their biggest obstacles. See 
Appendix Table 6; see also, e.g., E.D. Pa. Survey 11 (“Judges and juries still tend to believe police officers 
over citizens.”); E.D. Pa. Survey 17 (describing “more rural/suburban juries” in federal court); E.D. Pa. 
Survey 18 (“Jury bias.”); E.D. Pa. Survey 5 (“[C]itizens, judges and jurors believe a police officer’s word 
over that of anybody else.”); E.D. Pa. Survey 2 (“Juries believing cops.”); N.D. Cal. Survey 10 (“The 
deference the courts give to police officers and law enforcement agencies.”); N.D. Cal. Survey 8 (“The 
judges are extremely conservative. Pro-police bias all around.”); N.D. Cal. Survey 7 (“Juries like 
police.”); N.D. Cal. Survey 20 (“Judges excluding evidence of past misconduct of officers involved while 
including evidence of prior bad acts of victims thereby tainting the jurors’ view of the victims.”); N.D. 
Cal. Survey 9 (“Juror bias against minorities.”); N.D. Ohio Survey 11 (“Public perception that police are 
acting in good faith.”); N.D. Ohio Survey 1 (“Racism by public and judges.”); N.D. Ohio Survey 2 (“Pro-
police bias by judges.”); M.D. Fla. Survey 15 (“Federal law and federal judges.”); M.D. Fla. Survey 9 
(“Jury sympathy with police.”); M.D. Fla. Survey 5 (“Very conservative juries who lack empathy towards 
minorities and love [t]he police.”); M.D. Fla. Survey 4 (“Having a sympathetic finder of fact.”); S.D. Tex. 
Survey 17 (“Inherent racism.”); S.D. Tex. Survey 16 (“Public attitude is very supportive of law 
enforcement.”); S.D. Tex. Survey 11 (“Community perceptions about law enforcement.”); S.D. Tex. 
Survey 10 (“Jurors and judges trust cops more than citizens.”); S.D. Tex. Survey 5 (“Racial prejudice. If 
the cop doesn’t bloody the arrestee . . . juries are more likely to let the cop off.”); S.D. Tex. Survey 12 
(“Juries will give police ‘2 strikes’ before holding them accountable.”). 
 127 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney A (explaining that federal juries are often conservative and “when we 
win . . . they give us very little”); E.D. Pa. Attorney C (observing that it is difficult to win before federal 
juries and that “federal courts are just very hostile to these kinds of cases”); E.D. Pa. Attorney D 
(“[F]ederal juries are very difficult.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney A (explaining that judges in the Middle District 
of Florida “see these cases as almost a nuisance, waste of time” and describing a case in which a jury 
awarded $1 to a man who, while in handcuffs, was kneed in the abdomen so hard that he lost his spleen); 
M.D. Fla. Attorney B (“The judges tend to simply accept what the police say as gospel.”); M.D. Fla. 
Attorney E (describing a case where the plaintiff was bitten by a police dog, and the plaintiff was left 
“with [a] leg that look[ed] a chicken bone” and the jury entered a defense verdict); M.D. Fla. Attorney F 
(explaining “the jurors here are pretty damn conservative in the federal court”); S.D. Tex. Attorney B 
(explaining that “[c]ourts are so conservative” in the Southern District of Texas, and juries are “very pro 
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Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that attorneys look for cases 
and plaintiffs that judges and juries might find compelling. Part of this 
calculation concerns the underlying facts of the case. Attorneys report that 
they look for cases where the facts not only establish a constitutional 
violation, but are “horrific” or “outrageous.”128 As one attorney explained, “I 
mean, if I’m shocked . . . I figure then maybe some jurors will be shocked.”129 
Attorneys also look for cases with strong evidence of government 
liability. Ideally, the police department’s own reports establish that the police 
officer had engaged in wrongdoing.130 If not—and it will be the officer’s 
word against the plaintiff’s—attorneys reported that they are more likely to 
take a case if there is a video or other evidence to corroborate the plaintiff’s 
claims and undermine the claims of the officer(s).131 
 
police”); S.D. Tex. Attorney D (“[A] lot of the judges here are pro-police, pro-government and the cases 
are just more difficult to prosecute here.”). 
 128 M.D. Fla. Attorney A (“[T]he conduct has to be somewhat egregious [and] the client didn’t 
provoke the conduct or cause what happened to him.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney B (“You’re looking for cases 
where the facts are horrific.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney C (explaining that he considers “how outrageous the 
conduct looks on the video”); see also E.D. Pa. Attorney B (“[I]f I tell the story of what happened here 
the person who is sitting on the other side hearing that story is going to go, ‘Really? They did that?’ If I 
don’t get that reaction that’s going to be a difficult case.”); E.D. Pa. Attorney F (“I consider, does what 
they’re telling me sound like a constitutional violation where there would be some measure of 
maliciousness involved or some kind of racial prejudice or other kind of prejudice?”); N.D. Ohio Attorney 
D (looking for cases with facts that “really demonstrate abuse and excessive [use] of force”); S.D. Tex. 
Attorney A (“It really just depends on the facts of the case and if I think it’s something that’s viable and 
more importantly is it something that I think the jury will understand.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney F (“[W]hat 
are the facts? Like, are you saying an officer called you a bad name and you want to sue them? Are you 
saying an officer shot you in the back ten times and you want to sue [them?]”). 
 129 N.D. Cal. Attorney C. 
 130 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney C (“[T]here has to be a constitutional claim that I can prove. It’s 
helpful but not necessarily dispositive that when you read the police report, if you assumed everything is 
accurate that the cops still loses, which means that they have to lie their way out of it, and they’re not 
bashful about that—but that’s at least a good starting point.”). 
 131 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney G (“[T]he excessive force cases we bring, we almost always have 
something more than our client’s versions whether it’s on video or a photograph or very strong medical 
documentation or a witness.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney A (“Your typical tackling cases, or putting them to the 
ground, those are extremely difficult without some sort of video or witnesses or things of that nature, at 
least to illustrate that it’s not necessary.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney B (“If there’s video of course that’s a big 
factor.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney B (“There has to be a good witness to your version of events. Like this one 
I was just looking at there’s a guy who’s on probation and an officer sees him and sees he has a gun in 
his waistband and he was just talking with a friend. And the guy ran and of course the officer says he 
turns around and points the gun at him. So I need either a good witness or a video that gives us some 
evidence that that didn’t happen.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney G (“I take cases that a lot of lawyers don’t take 
and would never touch, either because I have a video that proves the officer lied or just because we have 
a great shot of proving that the officer lied in his report . . . and/or independent witnesses that are good 
witnesses that corroborate the victim’s story . . . .”); M.D. Fla. Attorney C (“[I]f it turns out that the police 
report does at least allege something that rises to the level of a criminal offense, then do I have 
independent witnesses or objective evidence like a videotape that supports the argument that the police 
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Attorneys also reported considering whether the plaintiff would be 
compelling to a jury.132 Attorneys want clients that juries will find 
sympathetic,133 and therefore reported preferring plaintiffs who are 
“likeable,” “credible,” and “articulate.”134 Some attorneys will not represent 
a person who was convicted of the underlying offense; a conviction or guilty 
plea bars a Section 1983 claim inconsistent with the criminal conviction,135 
and, even when the Section 1983 claim is not barred, some attorneys reported 
declining cases where the plaintiff was convicted of a crime in connection 
with the incident for fear that a jury would not find them sympathetic or 
credible.136 Some lawyers reported reluctance to represent a person who has 
 
officer was dishonest in how they wrote their report.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney F (“We look to see were there 
witnesses? Is there video?”); N.D. Ohio Attorney G (“Sometimes, the person will feel very strongly that 
they were mistreated, and I’ll get the . . . . bodycam and the video or cruiser cam, and I don’t agree.”). 
 132 Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interests in selecting plaintiffs they believe judges and juries will find 
sympathetic, likeable, and credible may make attorneys less likely to represent people of color, LGBTQ+ 
people, the mentally ill, and members of other marginalized groups—the very groups subject to 
disproportionate levels of policing. See, e.g., DAVIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 4, 8, 16 (finding that Black 
residents were more likely to be stopped by police than white or Hispanic residents; that Black and 
Hispanic residents were more likely than white residents to have multiple contacts with police; and that 
police were twice as likely to threaten or use force against Black and Hispanic residents than white 
residents); DORIS A. FULLER ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., OVERLOOKED IN THE UNDERCOUNTED: 
THE ROLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN FATAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS 1 (2015) (reporting 
evidence that the mentally ill make up a disproportionate number of people killed by police); CHRISTY 
MALLORY ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INST., DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS IN THE LGBT COMMUNITY 4–11 (2015) (describing studies showing discrimination and 
harassment of LGBTQ+ communities by law enforcement). 
 133 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney D (describing several cases brought on behalf of senior citizens who 
had interactions with the police). 
 134 See E.D. Pa. Attorney F (“My number one consideration is whether it’s a case that I could take to 
trial and win. So I look at who the plaintiff is and what they tell me about what happened to them. Do 
they sound credible?”); E.D. Pa. Attorney C (“[C]redibility of the plaintiff is of course paramount . . . .”); 
N.D. Cal. Attorney C (“[P]art of it is the overall circumstances; the client, who is the client, do I think the 
client is likable, or do I think the jury would like or feel sympathetic to the client. That’s not necessarily 
a deal breaker but it’s nice . . . [if the client] is going to come across sympathetic and articulate.”); S.D. 
Tex. Attorney B (describing the credibility of the plaintiff or complainant as a factor when deciding 
whether to take a case). 
 135 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 
 136 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney E (reporting that he will not take a false arrest case if the plaintiff was 
“convicted of the underlying crime” because then jurors will believe “he either got what he deserved,” or 
conclude “‘I don’t believe it.’”). Attorneys reported being less concerned when the civil claim was for 
excessive force. See, e.g., id. (explaining that “a different type of analysis” goes into excessive force cases 
because “a guy can be in the midst of committing a robbery, a police officer pursues him, but the police 
officer walks away without a scratch and this guy winds himself up in the hospital and he’s convicted of, 
say, the robbery, that is not an impediment at all to me taking the case”); M.D. Fla. Attorney C (“I tend 
to shy away from people who have not prevailed in the criminal arena . . . if it’s a use of force case, I’m 
far less likely to be concerned about the outcome in the criminal case, because I’ve known since the very 
beginning, people can be—can be guilty, and just beaten senseless.”). 
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ever been convicted of a crime, for fear that a jury will not believe them, or 
will award minimal damages because they have already been in the criminal 
justice system.137 
2. Concerns Related to the Amount of Damages 
Despite the availability of attorneys’ fees if a plaintiff prevails at trial, 
plaintiffs’ civil rights attorneys generally expect that their cases will settle—
if they are successful—and that they will be paid a percentage of their client’s 
settlement.138 Accordingly, attorneys have strong incentives to accept cases 
with high potential damages.139 Unsurprisingly, then, many attorneys 
reported that the amount of recoverable damages plays a significant role in 
their case-selection decisions,140 and several attorneys reported declining 
cases with low damages.141 As one attorney explained: 
 
 137 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney F (“Do they have a prior criminal history? Do they have a prior 
conviction history? Do they have a prior arrest history?”); M.D. Fla. Attorney A (“Generally, I won’t take 
a case if it’s somebody that’s ever been arrested before or spent time in jail because, usually, the only real 
damage you have is their loss of liberty and the trauma of going through the jail process and having 
charges pending. If somebody’s already had that in the past, then it’s not as traumatic or worth it in my 
opinion to take those cases.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney F (“[E]ventually the jury is the one who awards your 
client money and a three-time convicted child molester or a murderer . . . may get no money.”). Other 
attorneys expressed less concern about their clients’ criminal history. See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney E (“I 
don’t care what crime he’s committed or whatever.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney A (“[M]ost of the people that 
have had a run in with the law, it’s not their first time to the rodeo so to speak. I’ve represented people 
that were two-time convicted murderers in regards to a due process case, so that does not necessarily 
sway my opinion one way or another. It really just depends on the facts of the case and if I think it’s 
something that’s viable and more importantly is it something that I think the jury will understand.”). 
 138 See supra notes 35–39 (describing attorney fee arrangements). 
 139 Despite these strong incentives, some attorneys accept cases with lower potential damages. Some 
attorneys reported that they are less concerned about taking a case with low damages if they expect to 
take the case to trial and win, some attorneys made clear that they are more interested in the values 
underlying the cases than the amount of recoverable damages, and some attorneys reported taking a 
combination of low- and high-damages cases to spread these financial risks. For further discussion of 
attorneys’ varying views regarding the importance of damages in case selection, see Schwartz, supra note 
42. 
 140 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney C (“[O]f course we look at damages.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney A (“Well, 
there has to be some damage, obviously. Nominal damages don’t get us anything in these cases, so you 
have to have some damage.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney C (“I will usually start with the victim’s injuries, either 
it’s a serious injury or the video is outrageous or both.”); E.D. Pa. Attorney F (reporting they consider 
“what their injuries are. For example, if I’m going to take a malicious prosecution case or a wrongful 
false arrest case, I consider how long they were in jail.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney B (“Obviously you’re 
looking for cases where the damages are significant.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney G (“I look at the case—of 
course the seriousness of the abuse is a big driver.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney B (describing the “severity of 
the injury” as one of the considerations when deciding whether to take a case); S.D. Tex. Attorney D 
(considers “the severity of the injury”); S.D. Tex. Attorney F (“[Y]ou look at the physical damages and 
the monetary damages just like you would in any other case.”). 
 141 E.g., N.D. Ohio Attorney C (“[A]lways one of the issues is, you know, ‘Were they physically 
assaulted by the police officer?’ and if they say they [weren’t], I’m happy for them. No one wants 
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Obviously death cases or severe injury cases, I’m going to take a longer look at 
the case. But if it’s a simple, like, they called me a name, or they used a 
derogatory term or—I spent—they kept me in the back of their car for four 
hours. I’m not going to take a case like that. But if there’s a significant injury 
then I will.142 
Another attorney put it more bluntly: “[I]t sounds crass but we say, ‘Well, is 
there blood on the street? Because if there isn’t, why are we doing it?’”143 
3. Concerns Related to the Cost of Litigation 
When a plaintiff’s attorney receives a portion of her client’s settlement, 
she profits only if she receives more than the value of her time plus any 
money she spent litigating the case. Accordingly, lawyers may estimate how 
much time and money they will need to invest in a case before prevailing, 
and qualified immunity is one of many costs associated with these cases. For 
example, one attorney reported considering the need for an expert when 
deciding whether a case made financial sense to accept.144 Two attorneys 
reported that they consider where the law enforcement agency is, and how 
long it will take to travel to and from the department and the courthouse.145 
Some lawyers reported considering which jurisdiction is involved because 
different defense counsel have different approaches to defending these 
 
someone to be violently assaulted by a police officer. But [by] the same token there’s quite a lesser chance 
that I will take the case. So, they have to illustrate to me some type of tangible and somewhat substantial 
damages . . . .”); N.D. Ohio Attorney F (“[W]e’ve been focusing on the cases where the damages are 
significant enough [for] the investment that we put into the case in time, and money, because you know 
these cases are expensive.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney G (“Sometimes it’s just the damages are really, really 
low.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney F (“[I]f someone is just arrested, I’m not a big fan of those. Frankly, it’s not 
worth my time.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney C (explaining that the main factor going into a decision about 
whether to take a case “is the extent of the injuries; a lot of people get handcuffed or falsely arrested or 
whatever, or even taken to jail for a few hours or overnight. It’s kind of like getting hit by a car but you 
don’t sustain any personal injury so they don’t have any kind of injuries. I’ll let those go . . . .”); accord 
KRITZER, supra note 37, at 84 (reporting that, for contingency fee attorneys, “lack of liability and 
inadequate damages (singly or together) are the dominant reasons for declining cases, accounting for 
about 80 percent”). 
 142 S.D. Tex. Attorney D. 
 143 M.D. Fla. Attorney E. 
 144 See M.D. Fla. Attorney E; see also M.D. Fla. Attorney F (explaining he would be willing to bring 
cases in state court (which has a $300,000 damages cap) that he “would rate $50,000 to $200,000 and 
don’t have a lot of expense,” and describing them as “kind of safe bets, because of where I could get them 
to settle”). 
 145 See M.D. Fla. Attorney B (“You know distance might make a difference. So it’s kind of a 
mathematical calculation of miles divided by damages or you know whatever the formula is . . . . I’ve 
done some pretty serious police cases in Key West which is, you know, like 12 to 14 hours from here.”); 
N.D. Cal. Attorney D (explaining that “distance and location . . . is somewhat important”); M.D. Fla. 
Attorney D (explaining that she limits the number of federal cases she accepts in part because the federal 
courthouse is an hour from her office). 
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cases.146 As one attorney explained: “[T]he agencies matter, they do. Some 
of them you just know that you’re going to have to go all the way, and you 
got to make the decision, am I going to go all the way.”147 
4. Weighing the “Cornucopia of Factors” 
No lawyer described all of these considerations regarding the likelihood 
of success, amount of damages, and cost of litigation as relevant to their case-
selection analysis, but every lawyer reported that some combination of these 
factors played into their decisions. Some lawyers noted one area of strength 
can make up for weaknesses in another area.148 And several lawyers could 
not pinpoint what causes them to take a case. 149 As one described, “it’s a 
little like, how the United States Supreme Court defined pornography way 
back in the day . . . they can’t define it, but they know [it] when they see 
it.”150 
 
 146 See N.D. Cal. Attorney E (explaining that the City of San Jose offers very low settlements before 
trial because they want “to discourage lawyers from bringing 1983 claims,” but attorneys representing 
the county of Santa Clara “are willing to offer reasonable money to resolve the case sometimes” because 
“they look at it a little bit more from a business point of view”); M.D. Fla. Attorney F (reporting 
considering which jurisdiction is involved when deciding whether to take a case “because your chances 
of getting a resolution, short of getting in front of a jury . . . become more limited when you’re . . . dealing 
with a government entity like the City of Jacksonville”); M.D. Fla. Attorney D (explaining that some 
contract defense attorneys’ compensation is capped at $50,000, so defense counsel “runs me around until 
they’ve gotten themselves paid $50,000 and then they’ll start talking about settlements”). 
 147 M.D. Fla. Attorney E. 
 148 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney A (describing his general reluctance to accept a case where the 
plaintiff was previously arrested, but accepting one case despite the plaintiff’s criminal history because 
of the egregiousness of the facts); M.D. Fla. Attorney C (“[T]he stronger the Fourth Amendment 
violation, perhaps the less strong the client needs to be. Like, they can have obviously a horrific history 
of arrests, but if they’re a proven innocent person, if the case isn’t defensible, absent the police having a 
lie contradicting what’s in their police reports, I’ll probably do it. Unless the person is just such a jerk 
that I know that . . . they’ll never be happy with anything that I do.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney D (“I take cases 
for the following reasons. Number one, I really like the client and the client has a great case, the facts 
are—really demonstrate abuse and excessive of force. I take the case because I don’t like the client 
necessarily but the facts are great. I take the case because—I’ll take a case because everything sucks—
not only do I not like the client but I don’t like the facts, but the issue is so important that I feel the need 
to litigate it, which I’m criticized for [by] my office because I lose money, but it fulfills me.”); N.D. Cal. 
Attorney G (“If it’s a he-said, she-said situation, I’m really less inclined to take that unless there’s some 
special factors like perhaps my client here is a salt of the earth little old lady who’s never had problems, 
and she tells a story that’s hard to believe, but the event can only be explained with her version, so, if 
there’s something unique, I’ll take a one-on-one, but it has to [be] something kind of really dramatic and 
novel and unique to that circumstance.”). 
 149 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney C (“I cannot wrap my arms around what it is that causes me to think 
that this is the case I can work with.”); E.D. Pa. Attorney F (“[I]n the same way that the court considers 
the totality of circumstances, that’s kind of how I consider the cases.”). 
 150 M.D. Fla. Attorney C. 
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For the twenty-one lawyers who reported considering qualified 
immunity when selecting cases, it is one among many considerations related 
to the likelihood of recovery, the amount of recovery, and the cost of 
litigation. As one attorney explained, qualified immunity “is part of a bunch 
of factors . . . [j]udge, type of government sued, criminal history of the 
plaintiff, plaintiff’s personality, and damages to name a few.”151 Although 
“QI is always a negative weighing against taking a case,” it is among “a 
cornucopia of factors [he considers] in deciding whether to take a case.”152 
B. Why Some Lawyers Rarely or Never Decline Cases Because of 
Qualified Immunity 
Thirteen of the lawyers I interviewed reported that they do not consider 
qualified immunity at case selection.153 Another eleven reported that they do 
consider qualified immunity at case selection, but rarely decline cases 
because of qualified immunity.154 These twenty-four attorneys recognized 
that qualified immunity is often raised in civil rights cases, often makes 
litigation more complex and costly, and sometimes results in dismissal. 
Nevertheless, they offered four reasons why they rarely decline cases 
because of qualified immunity. 
1. Other Considerations Duplicate the Challenges of  
Qualified Immunity 
One reason that qualified immunity does not play a dominant role in 
these attorneys’ case-selection decisions is that other concerns duplicate and 
thereby minimize qualified immunity concerns.155 For example, several 
attorneys reported that concerns about judges’ and juries’ predispositions 
against police misconduct suits cause them to select cases with facts so 
egregious and evidence so strong that the cases are not vulnerable to 
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds.156 As an attorney from the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania explained, “[i]n the intake of the case I want to know 
that—qualified immunity or not—that if I tell the story of what happened 
 
 151 E-mail from S.D. Tex. Attorney F to author (June 9, 2018, 7:53 AM). 
 152 E-mail from S.D. Tex. Attorney F to author (June 9, 2018, 7:29 AM). 
 153 See Appendix Table 7 (setting out interviewed attorneys’ observations about whether and how 
qualified immunity influences their case-selection decisions). 
 154 See Appendix Table 7. 
 155 Alexander Reinert’s interviews with plaintiffs’ attorneys who bring Bivens cases revealed a 
similar perspective. See Reinert, supra note 48, at 493 (“[M]ultiple respondents indicated that they only 
accepted the most egregious cases for representation, which made it unlikely that qualified immunity 
would play a role.”). 
 156 See supra notes 126–137 and accompanying text. 
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here the person who is sitting on the other side hearing that story is going to 
go, ‘Really? They did that?’ If I don’t get that reaction that’s going to be a 
difficult case.”157 As another attorney from the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania explained: 
[W]hen I say qualified immunity is not a major factor [in case selection,] I think 
that’s because on excessive force particularly we’re pretty careful to begin with, 
putting aside any possible qualified immunity. I think our screening is such 
that—because we know particularly with juries [that they] often rule for the 
police in these cases anyway—we want to make sure we’ve got a pretty strong 
claim. And that will incorporate almost always enough evidence to show what 
the officer claims to have happened isn’t true and therefore, no qualified 
immunity.158 
In response to a question about whether qualified immunity played into 
his case-selection decisions, an attorney from the Northern District of Ohio 
offered a similar answer: 
We’re always evaluating: “Can we win?” If we think we can win, then we’re 
not worried about the situation where it’s close. Qualified immunity, I guess, 
would affect the marginal case where you’re not sure you’re going to win, and 
if it’s close enough, the judge might say, “Well, I think the defendants were 
acting in good faith.” But even just talking it through and think[ing] about it, I 
don’t think qualified immunity affects our case selection.159 
Several other attorneys agreed that they only take cases with egregious facts 
and clear constitutional violations because judges and juries tend to be very 
sympathetic to police and qualified immunity does not tend to be an issue in 
these types of cases.160 
 
 157 E.D. Pa. Attorney B. 
 158 E.D. Pa. Attorney G. 
 159 N.D. Ohio Attorney E. 
 160 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney B (reporting that qualified immunity is not “where my decision point 
is . . . because it’s all—I see it as so similar to whether you would win at trial”); N.D. Ohio Attorney C 
(“[I]t’s kind of hard to argue that the officer has qualified immunity if the victim says the officer beat the 
crap out of the person. I don’t see how I can argue qualified immunity for that . . . that’s another reason 
why I’m looking for more those types of cases.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney F (agreeing that qualified immunity 
is a consideration “but that doesn’t scare me as much as what the case looks like if you’re going to 
trial . . . . [I]f we feel that the case is actually good in terms of what happened, and there are disputed 
facts, then we don’t worry, we know [the qualified immunity motion is] going to come most likely. But 
we factor that in, I mean, it’s just part of the litigation.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney A (explaining that qualified 
immunity “really doesn’t even come in as the factor” when selecting cases because he only takes cases 
with “clear . . . civil rights violation[s]”). 
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2. Case Strategy Can Limit the Costs and Risks of  
Qualified Immunity 
A second reason that qualified immunity appears not to be a driving 
factor in case-selection decisions for some lawyers is that they have figured 
out how to structure cases in ways that limit the impact of the doctrine.161 
Attorneys reported bringing federal claims that cannot be dismissed on 
qualified immunity grounds—including claims for injunctive relief and 
claims against municipalities—when they think qualified immunity could be 
an issue.162 
Other attorneys reported filing state law claims instead of or in addition 
to Section 1983 claims to minimize the threat of qualified immunity. As one 
attorney from the Middle District of Florida explained: 
[T]here are clearly instances where police officers find incredibly unique ways 
to violate people’s rights, and I know that qualified immunity from the outset is 
going to be a problem. It may or may not deter me from accepting the case. But 
more commonly I’ll try to find a way to work around it . . . .163 
This attorney explains he will “work around” qualified immunity by bringing 
a state law claim instead of a Section 1983 claim. He explained: 
I can think of instances where I filed cases in the federal court, got the wrong 
judge. I voluntarily dismissed and refiled in the state court. . . . I’m always 
going to try to squeeze some money out of it in the state court if qualified 
immunity is going to be an impenetrable barrier.164 
An attorney from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania described the same 
strategy, observing that, “[w]hen we have a Philadelphia police case, we 
routinely will file in state court alleging only state torts, where we don’t have 
to run up against the [qualified immunity] doctrine.”165 As another Florida 
attorney explained, qualified immunity is “not the end-all be-all . . . .[I]t’s a 
 
 161 Accord Reinert, supra note 48, at 493 (observing that some civil rights attorneys avoid qualified 
immunity by filing cases in state court). 
 162 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney G (explaining that he might not bring a damages claim regarding a 
right that is not clearly established, but might pursue a claim seeking injunctive relief); S.D. Tex. Attorney 
E (explaining that he can avoid qualified immunity by suing the municipality); N.D. Ohio Attorney G 
(describing a case his organization brought against a sergeant who organized a SWAT raid instead of the 
individual officers in the raid because they “didn’t want to get distracted by their qualified immunity, 
which they thought they probably had”). 
 163 M.D. Fla. Attorney C. 
 164 Id. 
 165 E.D. Pa. Attorney C. 
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barrier but it’s a barrier to go around and if you’re in litigation that’s all you 
do every day all day anyway.”166 
3. The Risks of Qualified Immunity are Unpredictable 
Some attorneys reported that qualified immunity plays a limited role in 
their case-selection decisions because courts’ applications of the doctrine are 
so unpredictable. These attorneys observed that the judges in their 
jurisdiction have widely varying views of the doctrine, and so the dangers of 
qualified immunity often depend on which judge is assigned the case.167 As 
one attorney from California explained, “qualified immunity is an issue 
everywhere, but it has more to do with what judge you get than the facts of 
the particular case.”168 Likewise, an attorney from Florida observed: 
It’s almost sort of a luck of the draw. If you get a certain judge, you think, “All 
right, I’m going to survive summary judgment.” Other judges you get, you 
think, “All right, I know . . . I’m going to have a summary judgment against me 
and I’m going to have to file at [the] Eleventh Circuit and get it reversed.”169 
Because these attorneys believe different judges apply qualified immunity 
differently, and attorneys cannot know which judge will hear their case until 
they file, they have concluded that it is too difficult to predict the threat of 
qualified immunity to a particular case before filing. The costs and risks of 
qualified immunity may affect these attorneys’ litigation strategies and 
settlement calculations, but they reported it does not influence their 
assessments about whether to file any given case. 
4. Lawyers Willingly Accept Cases Vulnerable to Dismissal on 
Qualified Immunity 
Several attorneys reported that they accept some cases, knowing they 
might be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, because they hope the 
cases will have other types of benefits—they might clearly establish the law 
for future cases, reveal facts in discovery that could be used in future cases, 
 
 166 M.D. Fla. Attorney D. 
 167 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney B (“[M]y feeling is it depends on the judge you get more than the 
case law that’s out there.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney E (explaining that qualified immunity does not play a role 
in case selection in part because “it depends on the judge. And then it depends on, you know, your panel 
in the Ninth Circuit. . . . A case [that] looks cool today on qualified immunity in two weeks might look 
pretty bad. So, I don’t even think about it.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney C (explaining that qualified immunity 
does not influence his case filing decisions because “it . . . depends on which judge you get . . . and you’re 
not going to know who the judge is until you file the case”); see also infra notes 168–169 and 
accompanying text. 
 168 N.D. Cal. Attorney C. 
 169 M.D. Fla. Attorney A. 
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or reveal facts that would be meaningful to the plaintiff.170 Other attorneys 
report filing cases they know are vulnerable to dismissal on qualified 
immunity grounds simply because the cases are too important not to bring.171 
As one lawyer explained: 
[W]e are constantly bringing cases where we contend that the officer either had 
a person in custody and increased the risk of harm to the person or through some 
affirmative act dramatically increased the risk of harm . . . . [T]hose are gut 
cases that we feel we have to pursue because in our book the officer conduct is 
terrible and we need to—if we can come up with a theory, we’re going to pursue 
it. But those are going to be out there as high-risk cases.172 
An attorney from the Middle District of Florida offered a similar perspective: 
I don’t think [qualified immunity] plays that much [of a role in case selection]. 
I don’t think much at all. I mean, I get excited if I find an Eleventh Circuit case[] 
that says that [the right is] “clearly established” . . . . But I don’t shy away from 
[cases] because I’m afraid I’m going to lose, because I think there’s some value 
in bringing these cases. I really do.173 
Relatedly, attorneys explained that qualified immunity does not 
dissuade them from bringing cases because civil rights litigation is inherently 
risky, and qualified immunity is one of many risks in these cases. An attorney 
from the Northern District of California reported that qualified immunity was 
a challenge he signed up for by deciding to litigate civil rights cases. 
[Qualified immunity] comes with [the] territory and you have to just be 
prepared to go up to the Ninth Circuit because there’s going to be many cases, 
if you win on qualified immunity, they’re going to appeal, and if you lose, 
you’re going to appeal, so . . . that’s just part of the equation. If you aren’t ready 
for that, you shouldn’t be doing these cases.174 
 
 170 See, e.g., S.D. Tex. Attorney C (“[I]f someone comes in and they got the crap beat out of them, 
or something happened to their spouse or kid or whatever I’ll still take [their case] to just create a paper 
trail about the particular agency or about the particular officer so that if something happens again, then at 
least there will be something there for someone else.”); see also Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out 
Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014) (describing the ways meritless—
as opposed to frivolous—litigation can reveal valuable facts or help advance future changes in the law). 
 171 See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Attorney G (reporting that he does not “shy away” from cases that might be 
dismissed on qualified immunity “because I think there’s some value in bringing these cases. I really do. 
I’m not in the majority I can promise you.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney F (“[T]here are areas where we feel that 
the case is important enough to take the risk of losing on qualified immunity, just litigating it [is 
important].”); see also infra notes 172–173 and accompanying text. 
 172 N.D. Ohio Attorney G. 
 173 M.D. Fla. Attorney G. 
 174 N.D. Cal. Attorney C. 
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Indeed, many attorneys described civil rights litigation as a very financially 
risky line of work and reported that attorneys who litigate these cases are 
generally willing to work at a discount or loss because they believe in the 
underlying principles.175 
Models of case selection assume that attorneys and plaintiffs are 
rational economic actors and so will not file a case in which the financial 
risks outweigh the potential benefits. Scholars regularly recognize that these 
models do not capture noneconomic motivations for filing suit, but 
nevertheless rely on the model to predict filing decisions.176 Yet, for many 
attorneys I interviewed, decisions about which police misconduct cases to 
take—and decisions to pursue this line of work more generally—are not 
guided exclusively or primarily by economic calculations. Many of these 
same attorneys reported that they are not dissuaded from taking cases by the 
risk of dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. 
C. The Cases Some Lawyers Decline Because of Qualified Immunity 
Although all attorneys I interviewed reported that qualified immunity 
increases the costs and risks of Section 1983 litigation, and twenty-two 
attorneys I interviewed agreed that qualified immunity is among their 
considerations when selecting cases, just eleven agreed that concerns about 
 
 175 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney B (explaining that he is “glad that [his] practice doesn’t just depend 
on civil rights cases because that’s a very tough way to make a living”); E.D. Pa. Attorney D (“Personally, 
I enjoy [constitutional litigation] but [qualified immunity is] why a lot of attorneys won’t do it. You’re 
not going to make a lot of money from it. You can, but you have to stick with it and it is . . . sometimes 
tough-going, and, as I said, it’s not for the faint-hearted. You have got to be dedicated to it.”); N.D. Cal. 
Attorney B (“[T]hese cases don’t pay, you know . . . I basically had to be ready to retire before I could 
financially take these cases . . . .”); N.D. Cal. Attorney C (observing that some people in the Northern 
District of California have made money bringing civil rights cases, but “you don’t do [this work] because 
you become a lawyer and you want to get rich. It’s, you know, you do it because it’s a calling.”); N.D. 
Cal. Attorney D (“[Civil rights litigation is] not lucrative, and it has to be a labor of love, because anyone 
who is doing it simply to carve out a niche to make money, simply is not making money as effectively as 
they could be, and is going to be disappointed by it.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney D (“I get that people don’t 
want to do [police misconduct litigation] because there’s easier ways to make money. You know you 
could be a candy salesman, selling M&Ms or Snickers, and have a route and you’ll have a more consistent 
income than some civil rights lawyers.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney A (describing civil rights cases as “a long 
upward battle that’s not financially rewarding”); M.D. Fla. Attorney C (“[L]ooking back on [my decision 
to take civil rights cases] from the financial perspective, obviously it’s not the best decision.”); M.D. Fla. 
Attorney D (“[B]asically anything else will make you more money.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney F (reporting 
that he takes civil rights cases out of “public interest . . . I don’t rely on those cases like, ‘Oh, wow. That’s 
going to be—as a private practitioner, a big hit.’ I look at it more like . . . holding them accountable, a 
real wrong took place, and I think there’s exposure.”). 
 176 See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 34, at 22 (recognizing that “the choice of whether or not to sue 
may be influenced by forms of utility or disutility distinct from and not reducible to money”); Hubbard, 
supra note 37, at 712–13 (describing the possibility that some lawyers are not motivated by financial 
calculations of risk and reward). 
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qualified immunity cause them to decline cases with any regularity.177 These 
attorneys described three types of cases that they are inclined to reject 
because of concerns about qualified immunity. 
First, several attorneys explained that qualified immunity makes them 
less likely to accept a case if there is not a prior decision holding similar facts 
to be unconstitutional.178 Presumably, the existence of helpful precedent will 
always militate in favor of accepting a case. But the Supreme Court’s 
qualified immunity doctrine creates a particularly forceful pressure to find a 
prior case on point. The Court has repeatedly stated that government officials 
violate clearly established law only when “‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] 
sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] 
that what he is doing violates that right.”179 Although attorneys reported they 
are more inclined to decline cases when they cannot find factually similar 
precedent because of concerns about qualified immunity,180 one attorney  
made clear that he would be willing to take a case involving a “de minimis 
violation” if there was a prior case on point.181 
 
 177 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney A (“[W]e don’t take a case [when it] seems pretty clear to us it’s 
going to run into serious immunity issues.”); E.D. Pa. Attorney D (“[T]he false arrests—if I think they 
are going to ultimately get qualified immunity, then that claim is very difficult to prove. If I think that the 
individual officers are going to get out on qualified immunity, I will decline it.”); N.D. Cal. Attorney A 
(“I have to determine what the story is going to be at trial . . . so I can determine whether or not we’re 
actually going to get by summary judgment on a qualified immunity issue.”); N.D. Ohio Attorney A 
(“The immunity doctrines are everything in . . . real world litigations.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney E (“I married 
a lot of bad brides over the years . . . . And that has resulted in some painful losses over the years. Where 
QI gets granted, and you’re just shaking your head like, how. So now, I’m—I would [say]—I’m definitely 
not gun shy. I’m just more cautious before I get involved . . . .”). 
 178 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Attorney D (“[I]t seems like if there is not a case directly on point indicating 
that the law was clearly established to constitute a violation . . . then you risk being dumped on summary 
judgment because of qualified immunity.”); S.D. Tex. Attorney A (explaining that when deciding whether 
to accept a case he will assess whether the violation was “clearly established”); S.D. Tex. Attorney B 
(“[Q]ualified immunity [plays a role in case selection] and whether or not there was any established law 
that would support the position that the officer knew that the conduct was unconstitutional at the time.”). 
A few attorneys observed that the challenge of finding prior precedent is more difficult in false arrest 
cases than in excessive force cases. See E.D. Pa. Attorney G (explaining that concerns about qualified 
immunity play a limited role in case selection for excessive force cases, but that in some false arrest cases 
his firm will conclude there was a constitutional violation but expect that a court will find that facts are 
unique and the officer acted in good faith, and grant qualified immunity); N.D. Cal. Attorney G 
(explaining that in excessive force cases “there are a lot more cases and even though you may not have a 
case on all fours, it’s easier to make the argument that the officer should have known that what he was 
doing violated the Constitution when he struck that person while he was on the ground in handcuffs or 
with one handcuff on with his face down, right? . . . You don’t need another case that says that. You can 
just argue generally.”). 
 179 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (alteration in original and emphasis added) 
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
 180 See supra note 178. 
 181 N.D. Cal. Attorney D. 
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Second, several attorneys reported that qualified immunity doctrine 
discourages them from taking cases where they interpret the qualified 
immunity standard to require intentional misconduct.182 Attorneys repeatedly 
used false arrest cases as an example: although an officer has violated the 
Fourth Amendment if he made an arrest without probable cause, he is 
entitled to qualified immunity if he had “arguable probable cause”—
meaning he reasonably, though mistakenly, thought there was probable 
cause to arrest.183 In one attorney’s view, plaintiffs have to show that 
defendants “were fabricating evidence” to defeat a qualified immunity 
motion in a false arrest case.184 Several attorneys offered examples of false 
arrest cases that they had declined because the plaintiff could not show that 
the officers engaged in intentional wrongdoing.185 These same lawyers were 
less concerned about qualified immunity in other types of cases—repeatedly 
noting that qualified immunity plays little role in their decisions about 
whether to accept excessive force cases.186 
 
 182 Presumably, any claim requiring proof of intent will be more difficult to prove. See generally 
Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211 (2018) (describing the 
challenges of proving intent). In false arrest cases, the constitutional violation does not require proof of 
intentional misconduct, but attorneys believe defeating a qualified immunity motion does. 
 183 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Gwinnett Cty., 557 F. App’x 864, 870–72 (11th Cir. 2014) (describing and 
applying the “arguable probable cause” standard). 
 184 E.D. Pa. Attorney D. 
 185 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney A (“[T]here’s not a day that goes by that I don’t get a call from 
somebody who was just acquitted because it turns out that the person who said that they robbed them or 
stole from them or assaulted them had made it all up and the police arrested them anyway. And you know, 
these kinds of cases have qualified immunity written all over them. The police rely on a report. They have 
no reason to suspect that the person’s making it up . . . . [W]e don’t take a case that seems pretty clear to 
us it’s going to run into serious immunity issues.”); E.D. Pa. Attorney C (“[T]he issue of qualified 
immunity for us usually goes to false arrest type situations.”); E.D. Pa. Attorney D (“[T]he cases that I 
primarily decline are those dealing with just strictly false arrests. If I decline them at all—and I would 
say there is a small percentage of those that I decline—but the ones that I do decline, the false arrests if I 
think they are going to ultimately get qualified immunity, then that claim is very difficult to prove.”); 
E.D. Pa. Attorney G (describing false arrest cases he has reviewed where he believed there was a Fourth 
Amendment violation, but the judge was likely to find “arguable probable cause”); N.D. Cal. Attorney G 
(“In the false arrest arena, that is more problematic than in the excessive force arena.”); M.D. Fla. 
Attorney E (“I just spent this morning on the phone on a DUI case with the ex-cop in New York that got 
arrested for DUI. And he’s got so much righteous indignation. And a lot of it is properly placed . . . . But 
at the end of the day . . . he’s probably going to have to pay me hourly to litigate that case, because I don’t 
see a happy ending under QI, because DUI is an opinion-based crime for the large part.”); S.D. Tex. 
Attorney F (explaining the challenges of proving “arguable probable cause” in false arrest cases). 
 186 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney A (explaining that he is “certainly less concerned” about qualified 
immunity in excessive force cases); E.D. Pa. Attorney D (explaining that there is “no qualified immunity” 
in excessive force cases); E.D. Pa. Attorney G (explaining that his analysis of excessive force cases would 
be no different in a world without qualified immunity, but that in cases involving probable cause there 
might be “somewhat [of] an uptick in the cases we would bring”); N.D. Cal. Attorney G (“[T]here are a 
lot more cases [in the excessive force area than in the false arrest area] and even though you might not 
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Third, attorneys explained that the costs of defending against qualified 
immunity inform their assessment of whether a case makes financial sense 
to accept. As an attorney from the Northern District of California explained: 
[T]hey’re going to appeal every single time that their qualified immunity 
motion is denied and that adds two years minimum to the litigation and, I mean, 
this case I’m about to try in February was up on appeal for three years at least. 
So, that’s something that goes into the decision. Whereas you used to think okay 
if I go through the discovery I get what I want, we go through mediation, this 
case could be over in two years. Now you have to figure minimum five years 
before you get to trial . . . . [W]e’re trial lawyers and we don’t want to be 
appellate lawyers. We want to win a trial and now you have to factor in the 
appeal . . . . It just makes the case that more difficult.187 
Attorneys sharing this view are presumably more likely to decline low 
damages cases because their expected recovery will be smaller than the 
expected cost of litigating the qualified immunity defense.188 
Attorneys I surveyed agreed that qualified immunity makes them 
reluctant to accept false arrest cases and cases with low damages. In the 
survey, I described a scenario in which police handcuffed an African 
American woman for thirty minutes on the mistaken belief that she was 
driving a stolen car, and asked whether the respondent would accept the case 
and, if not, why.189 Forty-two of the ninety-two attorneys who answered this 
question reported that they would not accept the case.190 Of those who offered 
 
have a case on all fours, it’s easier to make the argument that the officer should have known that what he 
was doing violated the Constitution.”). 
 187 N.D. Cal. Attorney B. Note, though, that this attorney concluded that qualified immunity is not 
where her “decision point” is. Id.; see also N.D. Ohio Attorney C (describing his concern about cases 
going up on interlocutory appeal but also reporting that qualified immunity has more to do with what 
judge you get than the facts of the particular case). 
 188 See, e.g., E-mail from N.D. Ohio Attorney B to author (Jan. 8, 2018, 11:14 AM) (explaining that, 
because he “work[s] for an unrestricted legal services program and receive[s] a salary . . . [he] can take 
cases that private lawyers won’t take because they’re not financially rewarding enough to justify the 
work. . . . [He] imagine[s] private lawyers trying to make a living have to make some hard decisions about 
whether to bring a case and whether to assert claims that might end up with qualified immunity fights.”). 
 189 The full question read as follows: “Client A comes to your office. She is an African-American 
woman. She has no prior arrests. She tells you that, six months prior, she drove home from work and 
parked her car next to her apartment building. As she exited the vehicle she was stopped by two police 
officers. The officers told her that the vehicle she was driving was reported stolen and demanded to know 
what she was doing with the car. The officer had put the wrong license number into the police department 
computer system. The woman explained to the officer that she had her title and registration in the car, but 
the officer refused to check. The woman says that the officer handcuffed her hands very tightly for about 
one-half hour, at which point she was released. She reports continuing pain, tingling, and numbness in 
her wrist, continuing emotional distress, and $8750 in medical bills.” Joanna C. Schwartz, Police 
Misconduct Attorney Survey (UCLA, IRB No. 16-000470). 
 190 See Schwartz, supra note 36. 
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explanations for their decisions to decline the case, many wrote that the case 
would likely be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds because the 
officers did not engage in intentional misconduct, and that the expenses of 
litigation—including litigating qualified immunity—would be greater than 
the recoverable damages.191 
D. Does Qualified Immunity Screen Out Lawyers? 
Qualified immunity may also cause lawyers to reduce the number of 
civil rights cases they bring and discourage some attorneys from filing civil 
rights cases altogether. One attorney I interviewed reported that concerns 
about qualified immunity had caused him to stop taking Section 1983 
cases.192 This attorney has a diverse civil practice which at one point included 
a few civil rights cases. He filed one Section 1983 case in the Southern 
District of Texas during the study period with a colleague from Dallas.193 
Whenever he has co-counseled a civil rights case with that colleague, they 
“brief and brief” the cases on qualified immunity, but the cases “get pitched 
at summary judgment.”194 He has not filed any police misconduct cases since 
 
 191 See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Survey 6 (“Her damages are too low[,] and the police made an ‘honest’ 
mistake which could be dismissed on summary judgment.”); N.D. Cal. Survey 10 (“Court would probably 
dismiss case based on qualified immunity. Also, damages not high enough to warrant the time and money 
needed to prosecute this case.”); N.D. Cal. Survey 14 (“The expenses of litigation, unfortunately, would 
be greater than any expected recovery (including attorney’s fees.)”); M.D. Fla. Survey 13 (“The expense, 
cost, and burden of litigation in a case like this does not make economic sense for the law firm . . . . 
Claims against the officers could be dismissed under qualified immunity, and any Monell claim against 
the agency may be dismissed unless there is a policy or custom of this activity.”); M.D. Fla. Survey 14 
(“An affidavit from the police officer saying that he [or] she believed they had probable cause despite the 
error police made, given the fact that the error was not evident and known to the arresting officer, will 
suffice for qualified immunity purposes.”); N.D. Ohio Survey 2 (“There’s not enough damages. The cost 
of taking these cases to trial is routinely higher than the amount she is likely to recover.”); N.D. Ohio 
Survey 15 (“May not get past immunity. Client hasn’t sustained sever[e] injuries.”); N.D. Ohio Survey 
16 (“Fees incurred in litigation (time spent) will be wished away by the defense and the federal courts . . . . 
Qualified immunity is a nightmare because federal district courts will grant it even where not warranted. 
The potential damages therefore must be much higher.”); E.D. Pa. Survey 19 (“[I]mmunity.”); S.D. Tex. 
Survey 13 (“I don’t think qualified immunity can be defeated and Monell almost impossible without some 
prior racist incidents involving the same officers.”). Other attorneys raised concerns related to other 
factors that increase the costs and risks of a case, including judge and jury bias against plaintiffs and facts 
that were not sufficiently egregious. See, e.g., M.D. Fla. Survey 9 (“Injuries have to be substantial in the 
jurisdiction where I practice to have any real chance of recovery.”); N.D. Ohio Survey 16 (“Unwarranted 
hostility to such claims . . . . [W]e would like to take these cases, if federal courts were not so hostile.”); 
S.D. Tex. Survey 2 (“Jurors (and judges in my circuit) forgive an ‘honest mistake.’”); S.D. Tex. Survey 
5 (“Not an aggregious [sic] scenario for Texas.”); S.D. Tex. Survey 7 (“[B]etween difficult [j]udges and 
[j]uries, acceptable outcomes on similar cases are rare.”). 
 192 See S.D. Tex. Attorney G. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
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2012; in fact, he reports that he is “out of the business for the most part of 
suing the government. Simply because of all the immunities it is too difficult 
to be successful against them.”195 
I do not know how often lawyers stop bringing Section 1983 cases 
because of the challenges and burdens associated with qualified immunity. 
My study almost certainly underrepresents attorneys so discouraged by 
qualified immunity that they have decided not to bring additional cases—
attorneys no longer practicing in this area are less likely to be captured in the 
docket dataset, and those that are may be less likely to volunteer to 
participate in a survey or interview about civil rights litigation. But I found 
a great deal of evidence to suggest that the challenges of civil rights 
litigation—including qualified immunity—may have caused lawyers to 
decrease the number of civil rights cases they take or stop taking these cases 
at all. 
Several attorneys I interviewed reported that they knew of personal 
injury and criminal defense attorneys who took one or two Section 1983 
cases and then decided to stop bringing the cases because they were simply 
too challenging.196 As an attorney from Texas explained: 
[A] lot of lawyers bring one case and then when they’re confronted with what 
the rules and the laws are, they don’t do it, because the cases are very attractive 
to a personal injury lawyer who doesn’t know better. He goes, “Look, there’s a 
dead guy! What’s that worth, $10, $20 million? I’m going to retire!” Then they 
 
 195 Id. 
 196 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney D (explaining that qualified immunity is “certainly a high burden and 
that’s why a lot of attorneys don’t like to do” civil rights work); N.D. Cal. Attorney C (“I’ve seen a lot of 
lawyers who were successful personal injury attorneys and thought that, ‘oh, wow, well, I’m a good, 
successful PI attorney, I can take this police case and turn it into a nice settlement, a nice verdict,’” and 
then are unprepared to litigate police misconduct cases because they are in federal court and juries are 
less able to relate to the plaintiffs); N.D. Cal. Attorney F (explaining that some attorneys “like the idea of 
the work but then when you start doing it and you realize that you’re not going to be the big hero that you 
may have thought you were going to be . . . [s]ome people get a little gun shy or they feel like, well, I’m 
not going to take a case unless I have a guaranteed payment. That’s happening.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney A 
(“Not many people take these cases because you really don’t make any money on them.”); M.D. Fla. 
Attorney D (“I think it’s important work so I keep doing it but the colleagues I know that used to do it 
have dropped out, because they don’t find it to be lucrative enough.”); M.D. Fla. Attorney F (explaining 
that there are “very few [lawyers] who can make a living just doing these claims”); M.D. Fla. Attorney 
G (suggesting that eliminating qualified immunity “would encourage other lawyers to take these cases”); 
S.D. Tex. Attorney A (“[T]here are people that I hear of occasionally filing one [civil rights case], but 
they’re the same people that eventually decide they never want to file one again, and usually call me at 
the end of the day saying, ‘oh my god this case is screwed up, can you help me?’”); see also infra notes 
197–198 and accompanying text. 
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run into the civil rights laws. They spend $25,000 on their case and they lose it. 
And that’s the last one they bring.197 
An attorney from Florida similarly observed, “I think there’s a lot of . . . one 
and two and out . . . . [T]here’s only so much money you can lose before you 
figure out that it’s not the right way to go.”198 
Other attorneys reported that they have reduced the number of civil 
rights cases they accept because the cases are expensive to litigate and 
difficult to win.199 For example, one attorney from Pennsylvania explained 
that he now spends the bulk of his time on personal injury and medical 
malpractice cases, which he considers “easier work that pays a lot more 
money.”200 Another attorney from Florida used to bring only police 
misconduct cases but now litigates dental malpractice cases as well with the 
hopes that “the dental stuff perhaps will pay some bills.”201 Even attorneys 
who have been bringing police misconduct cases for decades and are experts 
in the field report that these cases are often money losers.202 
Responses from surveyed attorneys tell a similar story. Although the 
ninety-four attorneys I surveyed filed more cases, on average, than the 1,022 
attorneys who entered appearances in the cases in my docket dataset, the 
majority of surveyed attorneys from each of the five districts spend 25% or 
less of their time on police misconduct cases. Twenty-five (27.7%) of the 
ninety-four attorneys I surveyed reported that the percentage of time they 
spent on police misconduct cases was greater than the percentage of fees they 
received from police misconduct litigation—only two of the ninety-four 
attorneys I surveyed reported the converse.203 
Attorney appearances in the 1,183 cases in my five-district docket 
dataset offer additional circumstantial evidence to suggest that many lawyers 
may bring few civil rights cases—or stop bringing civil rights cases 
 
 197 S.D. Tex. Attorney F. 
 198 M.D. Fla. Attorney C. 
 199 See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Attorney D (explaining that he has brought police misconduct cases for twenty-
four years but that, in recent years, he “transitioned into . . . easier work that pays a lot more money, 
which is personal injury and medical malpractice”); M.D. Fla. Attorney E (“I’d say that I probably went 
from 50%, maybe 60% [civil rights cases] to 20 to 25% over the years . . . as I commonly say if you like 
to have your teeth in your hand after a fight, then do civil rights litigation. You’ll enjoy going to the 
dentist after most of the battles. And so, you know, I’ve decreased the number that I [pick].”); see also 
infra notes 200–201 and accompanying text. 
 200 E.D. Pa. Attorney E. 
 201 M.D. Fla. Attorney C. 
 202 See supra note 175. 
 203 See Appendix Tables 4–5. Appendix Table 4 sets out the percentage of time surveyed attorneys 
reported spending on police misconduct cases, and Appendix Table 5 sets out the percentage of their fees 
surveyed attorneys reported collecting from police misconduct cases. 
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altogether—because of qualified immunity and other barriers to relief. More 
than three-quarters of the 1,022 attorneys who entered appearances in the 
Section 1983 cases in my docket dataset entered just one such appearance 
over the two-year period of my study.204 Just 3% of the attorneys entered six 
or more appearances in Section 1983 cases involving law enforcement 
during the study period.205 There is significant regional variation in attorneys’ 
filing practices—just one attorney entered six or more appearances in 
Section 1983 cases in the Southern District of Texas during the two-year 
study period, whereas fifteen attorneys entered six or more appearances in 
Section 1983 cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during the same 
period.206 This regional variation tracks variation in the challenges associated 
with qualified immunity: In the Southern District of Texas, qualified 
immunity is far more often raised and granted than in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.207 
It is difficult to parse out the extent to which qualified immunity—as 
opposed to other challenges associated with Section 1983 litigation—might 
be discouraging lawyers from bringing civil rights cases. As I explore in 
other work, multiple aspects of civil rights litigation—including jury bias, 
procedural hurdles, and limitations on state law claims—may make it more 
difficult to practice civil rights law in Texas than in Pennsylvania.208 But, 
assuming others share the views of the attorney from the Southern District 
of Texas I interviewed, qualified immunity not only screens out some cases, 
but also screens out some lawyers. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
In this Part, I consider the implications of my study for our 
understanding of the role qualified immunity plays in constitutional litigation 
and the extent to which qualified immunity fulfills its intended policy goals. 
I then explore how doctrinal adjustments would better align qualified 
immunity, and Section 1983 doctrine more generally, with the realities of 
constitutional litigation. 
 
 204 See Appendix Table 1. Note, though, that some of these attorneys may have filed civil rights cases 
in federal districts that are not the focus of my study, or in state courts. 
 205 See Appendix Table 1 (setting out attorney appearances during the study period). 
 206 See Appendix Table 1. 
 207 See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 208 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Ecosystems, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (describing these various factors and the ways in which they combine to create dramatically 
different environments for civil rights litigation). 
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A. Understanding the Role of Qualified Immunity in  
Constitutional Litigation 
In a prior study I found that courts dismiss only a small percentage of 
police misconduct cases on qualified immunity grounds.209 This study makes 
clear that formal dismissals only tell part of the story of qualified immunity’s 
role in constitutional litigation. Qualified immunity motions had to be 
researched, briefed, and decided in almost one-third of the Section 1983 
cases in my dataset. Stays while motions in the district court and on 
interlocutory appeal were pending increased delay.210 Although the absolute 
risk of dismissal on qualified immunity grounds is low, my surveys and 
interviews make clear that the risk of dismissal weighs heavily on the minds 
of attorneys who file these cases—particularly because qualified immunity 
is most often raised and successful at summary judgment, after counsel, often 
representing plaintiffs on contingency, have invested in discovery. 
Apart from the costs and challenges associated with litigating qualified 
immunity in individual cases, qualified immunity doctrine increases the 
difficulty of engaging in the practice of civil rights litigation. Attorneys I 
interviewed echoed what judges and scholars have long said—qualified 
immunity is exceedingly complex, and it takes time to understand and stay 
abreast of changes in the doctrine.211 In addition, the pervasive threat of 
interlocutory appeals means attorneys must be comfortable litigating in both 
trial and appellate court. The costs and risks associated with qualified 
immunity are greater in some districts than in others. But lawyers around the 
country agree that the doctrine makes it more costly to bring these cases and 
more difficult to recover.212 
Models of attorney decision-making behavior suggest that attorneys 
would decline cases vulnerable to motion practice and dismissal on qualified 
immunity grounds because of these costs and risks. But my study 
demonstrates that the relationship between these costs and risks and 
attorneys’ case-selection decisions is not so straightforward. Twenty-four of 
the thirty-five attorneys I interviewed reported that qualified immunity rarely 
or never causes them to decline cases; another ten attorneys reported that the 
doctrine plays a more significant role in their decision-making process; and 
one attorney reported having stopped bringing Section 1983 cases because 
 
 209 Schwartz, supra note 5. 
 210 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text; see also Reinert, supra note 71, at 2080 (finding 
cases in which qualified immunity was raised took longer, on average, than the median of all federal civil 
rights cases filed during the same period). 
 211 See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
 212 See supra Part III. 
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of the doctrine. Attorneys so discouraged by qualified immunity that they 
abandon their civil rights practice are likely underrepresented by my study.213 
But I cannot otherwise estimate the extent to which my data reflect attorney 
perceptions and practices in the five districts I studied or around the country. 
What does seem clear is that qualified immunity plays a range of roles 
in attorneys’ case-selection decisions, and its power as a prefiling filter is 
highly dependent on which attorney is considering the case.214 The lawyers I 
interviewed and surveyed appear to agree that qualified immunity increases 
the costs and risks of bringing civil rights cases. Returning to the language 
of standard models of case selection, qualified immunity increases the cost 
of litigation (C), decreases the probability of success (p), and can reduce the 
size of possible judgments (J). But the lawyers I interviewed held different 
views about the extent to which these costs and risks duplicate other 
considerations at case selection, the magnitude of these costs and risks, the 
predictability of these costs and risks, the attorneys’ ability to mitigate these 
costs and risks through creative litigation strategy, and their willingness to 
accept cases despite these costs and risks.215 
To some lawyers, the challenges associated with qualified immunity 
appear insurmountable; others view qualified immunity as one of many 
challenges lawyers are trained to get around. Some lawyers shy away from 
false arrest cases because they must show an officer knowingly arrested their 
client without probable cause in order to defeat a qualified immunity motion. 
Others willingly accept these same types of false arrest cases, bringing state 
law claims in state court where qualified immunity cannot be raised as a 
defense. Some lawyers file cases they consider likely to be dismissed on 
qualified immunity grounds because they advance important interests—the 
cases may clearly establish a constitutional right for future cases, develop 
evidence of unconstitutional conduct by the officer or department that can be 
 
 213 See supra notes 192–208. 
 214 Although my top-line conclusion appears to contrast with that of Reinert, supra note 48, at 494, 
who concluded that: “Most attorneys seem to select cases to avoid any possible qualified immunity issues 
arising in the litigation[;]” our observations from our interviews are largely consistent.  Reinert and I both 
find that attorneys believe qualified immunity doctrine increases the costs and risks of constitutional tort 
litigation. See id. We also both find that some attorneys report qualified immunity plays a limited role in 
case selection because “they only accept[] the most egregious cases for representation, which ma[kes] it 
unlikely that qualified immunity would play a role,” that some attorneys limit the impact of qualified 
immunity by filing in state court, that some attorneys do not consider qualified immunity because cases 
vulnerable to dismissal advance other interests, and that attorneys who do consider qualified immunity 
when selecting cases may decline cases alleging novel or ill-defined constitutional violations. See id. at 
493–94. 
 215 Variation in attorneys’ weights and measurements of these factors complicates standard models 
of case-selection decisions. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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used in future cases, or reveal information important to the plaintiff or her 
loved ones. Other lawyers view civil rights cases as sensible to bring only if 
they are likely to be financially remunerative. Lawyers, new to civil rights 
litigation, may lose their first few cases on qualified immunity grounds.216 
Following these defeats, some lawyers may decide to dedicate the time 
necessary to learn how to avoid or defeat future motions raising the defense; 
others may decide never to bring another civil rights case again. 
How an attorney views and weighs the costs and risks associated with 
qualified immunity at case selection may be a product of any number of 
things, including that attorney’s prior experience bringing civil rights cases, 
the percentage of their legal practice dedicated to these cases, or their 
motivations for entering into this line of work. Attorneys’ approaches to 
qualified immunity at case selection may also be influenced by the 
jurisdiction in which they practice. My research shows that qualified 
immunity imposes more risks and costs in some parts of the country than in 
others. Other challenges associated with Section 1983 litigation—including 
unsympathetic juries and judges, and other substantive and procedural 
barriers—may also be particularly difficult to overcome in those same 
jurisdictions.217 In a related project, I explore how these various factors 
combine to create what I call civil rights ecosystems around the country.218 
For now, it is worth noting that the costs and risks of litigating Section 1983 
cases—including the costs and risks of qualified immunity—do not fall 
evenly across the country, and that that variation may well lead to region 
specific case-selection decisions. 
B. Evaluating the Purposes Served by Qualified Immunity 
My study also reveals insights critically important to ongoing debate 
about whether qualified immunity doctrine achieves its intended policy 
goals. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly described qualified 
immunity doctrine as drawn from common law defenses in existence when 
Section 1983 became law,219 it acknowledged over thirty years ago that it 
 
 216 See supra notes 196–198 and accompanying text (describing examples of this type of loss by 
novice civil rights attorneys). 
 217 See Schwartz, supra note 208. 
 218 See id. 
 219 See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (asking whether immunities “were 
so well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, that ‘we presume that Congress would have 
specifically so provided had it wished to abolish’ them” (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554–55 
(1967))); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) (“[O]ur role is to interpret the intent of Congress in 
enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting 
Congress’ intent by the common-law tradition.”). 
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“completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all 
embodied in the common law.”220 The Court restructured qualified immunity 
doctrine to balance “two important interests—the need to hold public 
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need 
to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 
perform their duties reasonably.”221 Scholars, advocates, and courts have 
criticized qualified immunity doctrine for failing to properly balance these 
interests.222 These critics contend that qualified immunity is unnecessary and 
ill-suited to shield officers from the costs and burdens of being sued, and 
undermines interests in government accountability.223 My findings about 
qualified immunity’s selection effects support each of these criticisms. 
1. Qualified Immunity Is Unnecessary and Ill-Suited to Shield 
Government Officials from “Insubstantial” Cases 
The Supreme Court imagines that qualified immunity is important to 
“society as a whole”224 because it shields government officials who have 
acted reasonably from the “harassment, distraction, and liability”225 
associated with litigation. Specifically, the Court expects that qualified 
immunity shields government officials from financial liability and from the 
burdens of participating in discovery and trial in insubstantial cases, thereby 
encouraging government officials to vigorously enforce the law and 
members of the public to accept public office. For decades, the Court’s 
assumptions about qualified immunity’s role in constitutional litigation and 
the deterrent effect of litigation went unchallenged.226 But, in recent years, 
 
 220 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). 
 221 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 222 For courts’ and advocacy groups’ criticisms of qualified immunity, see supra notes 26–27 and 
accompanying text. Scholars also raise criticisms of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Karen M. Blum, 
Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1887 (2018) (arguing that 
qualified immunity has prevented the development of the law, overprotected officers, created confusion 
about the applicable standards, and increased the cost and complexity of civil rights litigation); Alan K. 
Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitutional 
Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1997) (arguing that qualified immunity is ill-suited to resolve cases at 
summary judgment); John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851 
(2010) (criticizing qualified immunity doctrine for overly focusing on prior factually similar precedent 
instead of whether an officer clearly violated the Constitution); Schwartz, The Case Against, supra note 
2 (describing each of these criticisms of qualified immunity). 
 223 See sources cited supra note 222 (describing these criticisms). 
 224 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quoting City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 
135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015)). 
 225 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 
 226 See Fred O. Smith, Jr., Formalism, Ferguson, and the Future of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2093, 2094–95 (2018). 
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mounting evidence has shown that qualified immunity is neither necessary 
nor well-suited to perform its intended role. Police officers virtually never 
contribute to settlements and judgments entered against them, and there is 
no reason to believe that other types of government officials contribute more 
often.227 Cases are rarely dismissed on qualified immunity grounds before 
discovery and trial.228 And many other doctrines and procedural rules—
including courts’ power to dismiss pro se cases sua sponte at the outset of a 
case, pleading rules that require plaintiffs to allege “plausible” claims, 
summary judgment requirements, and substantive constitutional 
requirements—are available to weed out cases before discovery and trial.229 
One of the only remaining ways qualified immunity might serve its intended 
goal is by screening out insubstantial cases before filing, thereby sparing 
government officials the burdens and distractions of litigation. This study 
offers two important reasons to conclude that qualified immunity cannot be 
justified on this ground. 
First, qualified immunity does not reliably cause lawyers to screen out 
cases vulnerable to the defense. Two-thirds of the attorneys I interviewed 
stated that they rarely or never decline cases because of concerns about 
qualified immunity. Some attorneys reported that qualified immunity plays 
little role in their case-selection decisions because other considerations cause 
them to select only the most egregious cases, which are not vulnerable to 
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. These responses suggest that 
qualified immunity is unnecessary to screen out weaker cases; other concerns 
already dissuade attorneys from bringing them. 
Other attorneys’ explanations for their inattention to qualified immunity 
make clear that the doctrine is in many ways ill-suited to screen out cases 
before filing. Because the application of qualified immunity is judge-
 
 227 See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014) 
(studying litigation payouts in forty-four of the largest law enforcement agencies and thirty-seven smaller 
agencies over a six-year period, and finding that officers paid approximately 0.2% of the dollars awarded 
to plaintiffs and never contributed to the payment of a punitive damages award); see also Michael L. 
Wells, Qualified Immunity After Ziglar v. Abbasi: The Case for a Categorical Approach, 68 AM. U. L. 
REV. 379, 406 (2018) (concluding that my indemnification findings, see Schwartz, supra note 227, likely 
“are valid across the whole field of constitutional tort litigation”). 
 228 See Schwartz, supra note 5 (finding that 0.6% of 1,183 cases filed in five federal districts over a 
two-year period were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage and 2.6% were dismissed at summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds). 
 229 See id.; David M. Shapiro & Charles Hogle, The Horror Chamber: Unqualified Impunity in 
Prison, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2021, 2023 (2018) (describing the many barriers to relief in prison 
litigation that amount to “practical immunity” that “insulates prison defendants from liability at least as 
much as qualified immunity”); accord Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups for Official Accountability, 
Almighty Supreme Born Allah, supra note 27, at 20 (“Generally applicable rules governing pleading and 
proof are more than up to the task of weeding out frivolous Section 1983 litigation—just as they do in all 
others.”). 
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dependent, some attorneys conclude that it does not make sense to decline a 
case because of the doctrine; instead, they file the case, see which judge is 
assigned, and then decide how to proceed. Because qualified immunity 
applies to Section 1983 damages actions against individual officers—but not 
municipal liability claims, claims for injunctive relief, or state law claims—
attorneys report including claims invulnerable to dismissal on qualified 
immunity grounds to minimize the effects of the doctrine. And some 
attorneys are willing to accept the risk of dismissal on qualified immunity 
grounds as a means of developing the law, gathering evidence for future 
claims, or uncovering information valuable to the plaintiff about the case. 
Second, to the extent that concerns about qualified immunity cause 
attorneys to decline cases, the doctrine does not appear to do a good job of 
screening out “insubstantial” cases. Although the Court has not clarified 
what makes a case insubstantial, it has repeatedly suggested that 
insubstantial claims are “baseless” and “frivolous,” brought against 
“innocent” government officials who acted “reasonably.”230 However, the 
cases attorneys report declining because of qualified immunity do not appear 
baseless or frivolous. Attorneys report declining false arrest cases because 
they believe they must show intentional wrongdoing in order to defeat 
qualified immunity. But such cases are not necessarily baseless or 
frivolous—a plaintiff may be able to show a Fourth Amendment violation, 
which requires a showing of unreasonable behavior, without being able to 
establish a knowing violation. Other attorneys report declining cases with 
factual scenarios that a court has not previously held unconstitutional. But, 
as the Court has recognized, novelty is not a good proxy for merit.231 
Attorneys also report declining cases that do not make economic sense to 
bring given the costs and delays associated with qualified immunity. And 
some attorneys decline all civil rights cases because of the costs and risks of 
qualified immunity. None of these responses suggest that concerns about 
qualified immunity cause attorneys to decline cases that are baseless or 
frivolous. 
Perhaps, though, the Supreme Court intends qualified immunity to have 
a broader reach. The Court has repeatedly stated that qualified immunity 
should protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
 
 230 See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
 231 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (explaining that “officials can still be on notice 
that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances” and observing that the 
Court had previously “rejected a requirement that previous cases be ‘fundamentally similar’” (quoting 
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 263 (1997))). 
114:1101 (2020) Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects 
1157 
violate the law,”232 and may intend for qualified immunity to discourage 
lawyers from filing any case that does not meet that exacting standard. To 
the extent that qualified immunity discourages some lawyers from filing 
false arrest cases in which an officer has not knowingly arrested someone 
without probable cause, the doctrine arguably furthers this goal.233 Some 
attorneys report declining cases without factually similar precedent on point 
unless the case is so egregious that it could amount to an obvious 
constitutional violation.234 To the extent that qualified immunity encourages 
attorneys only to file egregious constitutional claims, the doctrine also, 
arguably, furthers this goal. 
But because plaintiffs’ attorneys can defeat a qualified immunity 
motion by pointing to a prior decision holding factually similar conduct 
unconstitutional, the doctrine does not actually encourage attorneys to screen 
based on the egregiousness of an officer’s behavior. Instead, it encourages 
attorneys to screen cases based the existence of prior precedent. An attorney 
may reject a case alleging serious misconduct because no court has held 
similar conduct unconstitutional, but accept a case involving a “de minimis” 
constitutional violation if there is a prior case on point.235 Moreover, to the 
extent that concerns about qualified immunity discourage some attorneys 
from taking any constitutional claims, the doctrine may prevent the filing of 
cases where defendants were plainly incompetent or knowingly violated the 
law. 
Qualified immunity has already been shown to be unnecessary and ill-
suited to shield government officials from the burdens of litigation in filed 
cases because of the prevalence of indemnification and the infrequency with 
which cases are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds before discovery 
and trial.236 This study suggests that qualified immunity also fails to serve its 
intended goals by screening out insubstantial cases before they are filed. 
Qualified immunity does not reliably cause lawyers to decline cases, and the 
cases that attorneys do report declining because of concerns about qualified 
immunity are not reliably insubstantial under any plausible meaning of the 
term. 
 
 232 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 233 See supra notes 183–185 and accompanying text. 
 234 See supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text. 
 235 See N.D. Cal. Attorney D; see also infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 236 See Schwartz, The Case Against, supra note 2, at 1803–11 (describing this evidence). 
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2. Qualified Immunity Inhibits Government Accountability 
This study offers further reasons to conclude that qualified immunity 
harms interests in government accountability. Although the Supreme Court 
has stated that qualified immunity doctrine is intended to allow plaintiffs to 
“hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 
irresponsibly,”237 courts and commentators have observed that qualified 
immunity doctrine undermines government accountability in several ways—
by fostering uncertainty about the contours of constitutional law,238 shielding 
from liability officers who intentionally engage in misconduct,239 and 
“send[ing] an alarming signal to law enforcement officers . . . that they can 
shoot first and think later.”240 This study suggests that qualified immunity 
may compromise government accountability in two additional ways. 
First, qualified immunity makes it more difficult and less reliably 
remunerative to bring civil rights cases. Researching, briefing, and arguing 
qualified immunity motions and appeals takes time and money. Stays while 
motions and appeals are pending can delay litigation and weaken plaintiffs’ 
evidence. Qualified immunity can reduce the monetary value of a case, either 
by dismissing higher value claims or limiting recovery to state law claims 
that may have damages caps and attorneys’ fees limitations. Qualified 
immunity carries with it the risk that cases will be dismissed—often after 
contingency fee attorneys have dedicated significant resources to the case. 
And, in order effectively to oppose qualified immunity motions, attorneys 
need to understand and keep up to date with changes in a very complex and 
dynamic doctrinal terrain and be prepared to litigate in both trial and 
appellate courts. Some lawyers accept these costs, burdens, and risks as 
among the many challenges associated with bringing civil rights cases. But 
it should come as no surprise that other attorneys, faced with these 
challenges, limit the number of civil rights cases they bring or get out of the 
business of civil rights litigation altogether. 
 
 237 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
 238 See, e.g., Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 499 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willet, J., concurring dubitante) 
(“If courts leapfrog the underlying constitutional merits in cases raising novel issues like digital privacy, 
then constitutional clarity—matter-of-fact guidance about what the Constitution requires—remains 
exasperatingly elusive.”), opinion withdrawn on reh’g, 928 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 239 See John F. Preis, Qualified Immunity and Fault, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1969, 1974–75 (2018) 
(describing Mullenix v. Luna, in which the defendant was shielded from liability on qualified immunity 
grounds despite acting in violation of an order, and Robles v. Prince George’s County, in which 
defendants were shielded from liability despite acting in violation of police regulations and state law). 
 240 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Schwartz, 
The Case Against, supra note 2, at 1814–20 (describing these and other arguments that qualified immunity 
impairs government accountability). 
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By reducing the number of lawyers willing to bring civil rights cases, 
as well as reducing the number of cases civil rights lawyers are willing to 
bring, qualified immunity undermines the government accountability goals 
reflected in both Sections 1983 and 1988. As Congress recognized when it 
passed the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Awards Act of 1976, “civil rights 
laws depend heavily upon private enforcement.”241 And, as Pamela Karlan 
has noted, “[a]ttorney’s fees are the fuel that drives the private attorney 
general engine.”242 Commentators have criticized the Supreme Court for 
limiting the circumstances in which plaintiffs’ attorneys can recover fees 
under Section 1988 because these decisions reduce the number of attorneys 
willing to take civil rights cases and skew the types of cases they select.243 
To the extent that qualified immunity doctrine makes it more difficult for 
lawyers to make a living bringing civil rights cases and discourages lawyers 
from entering into this line of work, the doctrine likewise undermines 
longstanding interests in creating a market for private attorneys general. 
Second, qualified immunity doctrine inhibits the development of 
constitutional law in underappreciated ways. Commentators have already 
observed that the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence—which allows 
courts to grant qualified immunity without ruling on the underlying merits 
of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims—leads to constitutional stagnation.244 
This study suggests that qualified immunity may also inhibit the 
development of constitutional law by discouraging lawyers from filing cases 
involving novel claims. Attorneys believe that cases are more likely to be 
dismissed on qualified immunity grounds if they cannot point to factually 
similar precedent, and some report they are more likely to decline cases if 
they cannot find a prior case on point. The inclination not to file these types 
of novel cases creates a vicious cycle—if lack of precedent makes a certain 
 
 241 S. REP. NO. 1011, at 2 (1976). 
 242 Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 205. 
 243 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 36, at 185–86 (describing Supreme Court decisions that limit what 
it means to be a “prevailing party” (Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001)), eliminate fee enhancements for risky cases (City of Burlington v. 
Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992)), and allow defendants to offer settlements conditioned on waivers of 
attorneys’ fees (Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986)), and arguing that all three limitations on attorneys’ 
fees “limit the effectiveness of the private attorney general system”); Karlan, supra note 242, at 207–08 
(explaining that the Court’s decision in Buckhannon skews attorneys’ case-selection decisions, pushing 
them to “choose lawsuits in which damages are available over lawsuits that involve only injunctive relief, 
even if the latter lawsuits are more socially valuable”); Reingold, supra note 36, at 12–20 (arguing that 
the Court’s decision in Evans discourages lawyers from taking cases with modest damages and those 
seeking solely injunctive relief). 
 244 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 50, at 34. 
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type of case difficult to bring, then fewer lawyers will bring those types of 
cases, and those rights are even less likely to become clearly established.245 
Some have defended qualified immunity on the ground that it 
encourages the development of constitutional law by allowing a court to 
announce a new constitutional right while shielding the government officials 
sued in the case from financial liability.246 I have previously expressed 
skepticism about this argument in favor of qualified immunity, both because 
courts infrequently decide cases in this manner and because those decisions 
infrequently do much to expand the contours of constitutional rights.247 This 
study offers another reason to be skeptical of this defense of qualified 
immunity. When a court announces a new constitutional right but grants 
qualified immunity to the defendants in the case, the plaintiff does not 
recover and the plaintiff’s attorney—who likely will have brought the case 
on contingency—will not be paid. Lawyers willing to bear this risk of 
financial loss will continue to file cases vulnerable to dismissal on qualified 
immunity grounds as a means of developing the law. But it is far from clear 
that we should expect plaintiffs’ attorneys to bankroll efforts to clarify the 
scope of constitutional rights. And few attorneys may be willing or able to 
bear the risk of these financial losses with any regularity. 
C. Moving Forward 
The Supreme Court has said that evidence about the realities of 
constitutional litigation might “justify reconsideration of the balance struck” 
in its qualified immunity decisions.248 In previous work, I have shown that 
government defendants rarely bear financial liability in civil rights cases, and 
that qualified immunity rarely leads to the dismissal of cases before 
discovery and trial.249 Here, I show that qualified immunity imposes 
previously unappreciated costs and burdens on attorneys bringing these 
cases, and is unnecessary and ill-suited to screen out insubstantial cases 
before filing. This evidence, taken together, makes clear that the Court 
should adjust the balance it has struck with qualified immunity. My findings 
 
 245 Accord Reinert, supra note 48, at 494 (suggesting that attorneys’ case-selection decisions, geared 
to avoid qualified immunity dismissals, may mean that “the vast majority of Bivens cases never test the 
limits of existing law, because the attorneys who file them select cases that are within the ‘clearly 
established’ zone that will defeat a qualified immunity defense”). 
 246 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE 
L.J. 87, 99–100 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 484 (2011). 
 247 See Schwartz, The Case Against, supra note 2, at 1826–30. 
 248 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 n.3 (1987). 
 249 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 65–70; Schwartz, supra note 227, at 938–43. 
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about qualified immunity’s role in case selection support several possible 
adjustments to the doctrine that I and other commentators have proposed. 
For example, John Jeffries has argued that an officer’s entitlement to 
qualified immunity should turn not on whether the law is clearly established 
by prior decisions, but on whether the conduct was “clearly 
unconstitutional.”250 In Jeffries’s view, the current standard’s focus on 
whether a prior case has held the conduct unconstitutional fails to punish 
behavior that is clearly unconstitutional, yet novel.251 The “clearly 
established” standard also makes unfounded assumptions about the ways in 
which government officials learn about the law. As Judge Browning has 
explained: 
The Supreme Court’s obsession with the clearly established prong assumes that 
officers are routinely reading Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit opinions in their 
spare time, carefully comparing the facts in these qualified immunity cases with 
the circumstances they confront in their day-to-day police work. It is hard 
enough for the federal judiciary to embark on such an exercise, let alone likely 
that police officers are endeavoring to parse opinions. It is far more likely that, 
in their training and continuing education, police officers are taught general 
principles, and, in the intense atmosphere of an arrest, police officers rely on 
these general principles, rather than engaging in a detailed comparison of their 
situation with a previous Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit case.252 
Moreover, as Fred Smith has argued, if qualified immunity turned on 
whether the defendant’s conduct was clearly unconstitutional, the standard 
would be better aligned with common law principles that are the ostensible 
basis for the doctrine.253 
 
 250 Jeffries, supra note 81, at 867–68. 
 251 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 256 
(2013). For illustrations of this concern, see Brief of Cross-Ideological Groups Dedicated to Ensuring 
Official Accountability, Baxter, supra note 27, at 14–16, 16 n.16, which describes several cases in which 
courts have found constitutional violations but granted qualified immunity, including cases against 
“deputy sheriffs who conducted an ‘early-morning, SWAT style raid’ in which a family with young 
children was detained for two-and-a-half hours in their house after a warrant-based search turned up 
empty”; an officer who lied in an affidavit supporting a teacher’s arrest for falsifying student grades; a 
child-protective-services caseworker “whose false statements in support of a removal order resulted in 
minor children being taken from their families, separated, and denied visitation”; a police officer who 
“during a routine traffic stop, directed the vehicle’s driver to sit on the officer’s cruiser, pointed a gun at 
the driver’s head, and threatened to kill him if he declined to surrender on weapons charges when the 
officer discovered a gun in the back seat”; police officers who stole personal property seized as evidence; 
and a police officer who “unlawfully detain[ed], handcuff[ed], interrogate[d], and book[ed] and charge[d] 
[a] seventh-grader in the hallway during class as permitted by his disability accommodation”. 
 252 Manzanares v. Roosevelt Cty. Adult Det. Ctr., 331 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1293 (D.N.M. 2018). 
 253 See Smith, supra note 226, at 2110–11 (arguing that nineteenth century American courts applied 
something akin to a negligence or fault standard for government actors, which “arguably comes closer to 
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This study offers additional reasons to prefer the “clearly 
unconstitutional” standard. Just as the “clearly established” standard can 
cause courts to dismiss meritorious yet novel claims,254 it can also lead 
attorneys to decline meritorious cases simply because a prior decision has 
not held similar conduct to be unconstitutional. During litigation, the “clearly 
established” standard can increase the time and cost associated with motion 
practice, as plaintiff’s counsel must search for cases in which factually 
similar conduct was held unconstitutional in order to defeat qualified 
immunity. And, in order to maintain a successful civil rights practice, 
lawyers must stay abreast of complicated, confusing, and perpetually 
changing rules about how similar the facts of prior cases must be and which 
courts can clearly establish the law—a challenge that appears to cause some 
attorneys to stop bringing civil rights cases altogether. 
My findings also support calls to eliminate interlocutory appeals of 
qualified immunity denials.255 The Supreme Court allows defendants 
immediately to appeal denials of qualified immunity motions because it 
believes interlocutory appeals further the doctrine’s goal of shielding 
government officials from the costs and burdens of litigation.256 Yet, as Judge 
Gwin of the Northern District of Ohio has observed, interlocutory appeals 
often have the opposite effect, “increas[ing] the burden and expense of 
litigation both for government officers and for plaintiffs” because they take 
time and money to brief and decide.257 Moreover, because lower court 
decisions are usually affirmed, interlocutory appeals often do not even save 
parties and judges the time needed to be spent on trial.258 The plaintiffs’ 
attorneys I interviewed and surveyed shared Judge Gwin’s concerns about 
the cost and time necessary to litigate qualified immunity. In addition, 
attorneys reported that the possibility of interlocutory appeal increases the 
difficulty of bringing civil rights cases for several reasons: because attorneys 
must be prepared to litigate in both trial and appeals courts; because the delay 
 
Jeffries’s ‘clearly unconstitutional’ or ‘clearly unlawful’ standard than the Court’s ‘clearly established’ 
standard”). 
 254 Jeffries, supra note 251, at 256. 
 255 For other arguments that qualified immunity is unlawful, and other suggested fixes, see Michael 
E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 169 
(2019), which argues that the collateral order doctrine does not support allowing interlocutory appeals of 
qualified immunity denials, and recommends that appeals be prohibited or limited, and that courts more 
frequently sanction frivolous appeals. 
 256 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1985). 
 257 Wheatt v. City of East Cleveland, Nos. 1:17-cv-377 and 1:17-cv-611, 2017 WL 6031816, at *4 
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2017). For another discussion of the complexities of deciding interlocutory appeals, 
see Bryan Lammon, Blatant Contradictions in Qualified-Immunity Appeals, 55 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020). 
 258 See Wheatt, 2017 WL 6031816, at *4. 
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can make it more costly to prepare for trial; and because witnesses’ 
recollections may fade in the year or more that a case is stayed on appeal. 
These costs, delays, and challenges make it more taxing to bring civil rights 
cases and may discourage some lawyers from pursuing this line of work. 
Eliminating interlocutory appeals would reduce these barriers for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, and would further the Court’s interest in reducing the cost, time, 
and complexity of civil rights litigation. 
Finally, the results of my study support calls to eliminate qualified 
immunity or return the defense to the scope of common law defenses in 
existence at the time Section 1983 became law. The original justification for 
qualified immunity—that it serves as an extension of common law principles 
in effect when Section 1983 became law—has been called into serious 
doubt.259 For more than thirty-five years, the Supreme Court has defended 
qualified immunity doctrine as a means of balancing interests in government 
accountability with interests in shielding government officials from the costs 
and burdens of insubstantial litigation.260 But this study, and my research 
more generally, makes clear that qualified immunity fails to achieve this 
balance. The doctrine undermines government accountability in multiple 
ways and has proven ill-suited and unnecessary to screen out insubstantial 
cases both before and after cases are filed. If qualified immunity is not 
serving its intended policy goals, we should do away with qualified 
immunity or, at the very least, reverse the expansions to the doctrine made 
with the intent of achieving these goals.261 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has long asserted that qualified immunity benefits society by 
shielding government officials from the costs and burdens of litigation. But 
a growing body of empirical research makes clear that qualified immunity 
doctrine is not achieving its intended policy goals. This Article explores a 
 
 259 See generally William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018) 
(arguing that there was no common law defense comparable to qualified immunity in existence in 1871, 
when § 1983 became law); see also supra note 27 (briefs raising this concern). 
 260 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (describing qualified immunity as balancing 
“the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens” and “the need to protect officials 
who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous 
exercise of official authority”). 
 261 The Court may be reluctant to do away with qualified immunity for fear that doing so would harm 
government and society in a variety of ways. Commentators have predicted that eliminating qualified 
immunity would cause plaintiffs to file many more frivolous suits and recover more money against 
government defendants in these cases, would cause government officials to be overly timid on the street, 
and would make it more difficult to hire people for government jobs. For further discussion of these 
concerns, and my alternative predictions about how constitutional litigation would function in a world 
without qualified immunity, see Schwartz, supra note 42. 
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previously untested justification for qualified immunity suggested by its 
defenders—that the doctrine discourages plaintiffs from filing insubstantial 
cases. Based on a study of almost 1,200 federal court dockets, and surveys 
and interviews of plaintiffs’ attorneys who entered appearances in these 
cases, I find that qualified immunity doctrine amplifies the burdens and risks 
of constitutional litigation on plaintiffs’ attorneys and likely dampens 
attorneys’ willingness to bring these types of cases, but does not effectively 
weed out insubstantial cases at the prefiling stage. 
The Supreme Court will undoubtedly have multiple opportunities to 
reconsider qualified immunity in the near future. When the Court does grant 
certiorari in a qualified immunity case, advocates across the political 
spectrum will likely argue that qualified immunity should be abolished or 
greatly limited because the doctrine bears little resemblance to common law 
defenses in 1871, and because the doctrine fails to achieve its intended policy 
goals. This study offers additional reasons to conclude that qualified 
immunity fails to achieve these policy goals and undermines interests in 
government accountability. 
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APPENDIX 
Tables 1–3 reflect the total number of appearances by all of the 1,022 
attorneys who entered appearances in 2011–2012 in my docket dataset 
(Table 1); the appearances of attorneys I interviewed during the two-year 
period in my docket dataset (Table 2); and the appearances surveyed 
attorneys reported over a five-year period in police misconduct cases (Table 
3). Because the attorney surveys were confidential, I cannot verify the 
accuracy of Table 3. Appendix Table 4 sets out the percentage of time 
surveyed attorneys reported spending on police misconduct cases, and 
Appendix Table 5 sets out the percentage of their fees surveyed attorneys 
reported collecting from police misconduct cases. Appendix Table 6 sets out 
survey respondents’ answers regarding the “biggest obstacle to bringing 
police misconduct cases” in the jurisdiction they sue most frequently. 
Appendix Table 7 sets out general information about the attorneys I 
interviewed. 
TABLE 1: APPEARANCES BY ALL ATTORNEYS IN 2011–2012 





















































N (Attorneys) 138 184 174 266 260 1022 
 
TABLE 2: APPEARANCES BY INTERVIEWED ATTORNEYS IN 2011–2012 
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TABLE 3: APPEARANCES REPORTED BY SURVEYED ATTORNEYS FROM 2012–2017 
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TABLE 4: AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF TIME CURRENTLY SPENT ON POLICE  
MISCONDUCT CASES, REPORTED BY SURVEYED ATTORNEYS 
% Time 
Spent 
S.D. TX M.D. FL N.D. OH N.D. CA E.D. PA All 
No 
response 
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TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE OF FEES CURRENTLY EARNED FROM POLICE  
MISCONDUCT CASES, REPORTED BY SURVEYED ATTORNEYS 
% Fees 
Earned 
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TABLE 6: SURVEYED ATTORNEYS’ REPORTED “BIGGEST OBSTACLE  
TO BRINGING POLICE MISCONDUCT CASES” 
A question in my online survey asked: “What is the biggest obstacle to 
bringing police misconduct cases in the jurisdiction you sue most 
frequently?” Attorneys had a blank space that they could fill in. Eighty-five 
of the ninety-four attorneys who took the survey answered this question and 












































































































































114:1101 (2020) Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects 
1169 
TABLE 7: OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWED ATTORNEYS’ RESPONSES 
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